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Abstract
The construction of secure software is a notoriously difficult task. The abstract
security requirements have to be turned into functional requirements and then
implemented. However, only few techniques allow to verify that the implemented
elements fulfill the originally expressed requirements. The potential gap between
the specification and the implementation gets even wider with iterative development
schemes where code (and sometimes specification) is updated numerous times.
In this document we propose a methodology aimed at facilitating the co-evolution of
the security requirements and the implemented code. Focusing on the access-control
perspective, we provide models and algorithms to specify the expected requirements
and to extract the implemented access-control rules directly from the executable
source code. Then we verify the conformance of the implemented features towards
the specified requirements and, if inconsistencies are found, we provide potential
corrective measures that can be applied directly into the source code.
keywords : access-control, security policy, verification, model extraction, model
weaving
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Introduction
Building secure software is a notoriously complex task: from the specification of requirements to the pro-
duction of code, developers must make sure that any change they make (for instance for performance
reason or to comply with late-customer requirement update) does not break the desired properties. Multi-
plying code updates, iterative software development further increases this risk. The costs, both in terms of
time and money, of those updates increase as the delivery-time approaches. Due to those rising costs, late
modifications are often applied directly to the source code without checking thoroughly their impact on the
security model.
Most of the time, the "validation" of the new/updated feature is only done through "clever" programmer
affirmation and/or some limited testing. Such a process makes it very difficult to detect every possible
model corruption occurring due to the change. Several approaches have been developed to address this
problem: automating the testing process like in JUnit [JUn10], maximizing test-coverage [LTMPB08]
[MLTB09] [MFBLT08], automated changes specification/propagation like in Aspect-Oriented Program-
ming [KLM+97] or UMLSec [Jur05] or complete formal approach like the B-methodology [Abr96] or
abstract interpretation [CDH+00], [HP98]. The problem with such methodologies is that developers up-
dating the code, albeit mastering the chosen development language, usually have little to no knowledge
of models and automated proof. So they have to choose between understandable incomplete results given
through limited testing or cryptic model-checking results abstracted from their code. Neither of those is
satisfactory in terms of completeness and usability.
In our opinion, both the development process and the resulting software quality and security can be im-
proved with the introduction of helper tools and methodologies based on formal methods. Our contribution
consists in the proposal and precise definition of a methodology and an environment supporting such an
helper tool. We will evaluate to what extent an automated security property extraction directly from the
source code, its verification and, if applicable, its correction is feasible. And if positive, we will investigate
the level of developer interaction required for this process.
1
2 INTRODUCTION
The models and algorithms needed to assist the developer to find any side-effects following updates in the
code will be presented. For simplicity, we will focus on the aspect-control perspective and offer the devel-
opers a methodology able to automatically make explicit the impacts of changes made to the source code
on the desired security model and properties.
The two first chapters of this document delimit the field in which this reflexion takes place. Chapter 1 intro-
duces the various aspects of software security and clarifies the notions of identification, authentication and
authorization. Then a special focus is done on the access-control perspective and its particularities. Chapter
2 presents an overview of the current set of techniques / methodologies aimed at avoiding or limiting the
impact of vulnerabilities on the resulting software system. The various approaches are detailed and con-
fronted to the usual pitfalls of a real-world software development process.
Chapter 3 introduces the motivating problem from which our research takes source. It describes the scope
of our approach and the set of problems frequently encountered by software developers we try to alleviate.
It also introduces the running example that will be used every time applicable throughout this document to
illustrate the methodology and the algorithms.
Chapters 4 to 6 detail our proposed methodology. The models and algorithms related to the extraction of the
access-control model directly from the source code and the modeling of the considered software system are
provided in chapter 4. Chapter 5 focuses on the verification of these models and properties. It also adresses
the adaptation and reporting of the verification results back to the users, both in the model and directly into
the source code. Then chapter 6 details the weaving of the resulting models back into the executable code
Finally, chapter 7 summarizes the achievements and setbacks of the presented methodology. The elements
learned from the application of the methodology to the case study are discussed, followed by a general eval-
uation of the method and paths for potential future improvements. Chapter 8 then presents a quick overview
of the prototype tool developed to support the presented methodology.
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This chapter introduces software systems and the related aspects of security. A quick introduction to the
notions of identification, authentication and authorization will be also presented, followed by some notions
of access-control.
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1.1 Software System
The term “software system” covers a much broader scope than a simple assembly of pieces of code; it usu-
ally consists of a set of programs developed for a specific hardware in order to fulfill some requirements.
It can be described as “a system based on software forming part of a computer system (a combination of
hardware and software). The term "software system" is often used as a synonym of computer program or
software; is related to the application of systems theory approaches in software engineering context and
are used to study large and complex software, because it focuses on the major components of software and
their interactions; and also related to the field of software architecture.’’1
With such a definition, a software system can be anything from a simple phone-embedded controller to
complex operating systems like Unix or Windows running on distributed hardware configurations. Sub-
systems of a software system can also be considered as a software system: database software, specialized
librairies or a graphical interface are examples of autonomous software systems.
More formally, we’ll define a software system as any piece of software used by one or more users (be it
human or another software system) in order to perform one task.
1.2 Software Security
With the proliferation of software systems in our environment, more and more aspects of our every day life
are managed through software: paiements are done via electronic credit-cards, communications use com-
puter networks, our lives and identities are stored in multiple databases... The need for security becomes
ever more important. More or less recent events showed that insecure software can affect people’s life in
many ways.
• the loss of the details of three million candidates for the driving theory test in the UK, jeopardizing
some aspects of their private life. 2
• Ariane 5 Flight 5013, which resulted in the crash and total loss of the multi-million rocket.
• stolen CD with the names of about 1500 German citizens hiding cash away in Switzerland, bought
by the German finance ministry. 4
1feb. 2011, https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Software_system
2dec. 2007 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7147715.stm
3jun. 1996 http://www.wired.com/software/coolapps/news/2005/11/69355?currentPage=2
4feb. 2010 http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5296146,00.html
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• exposed JPMorgan Chase customers information after a breach at a marketing sub-contractant, once
again exposing private clients information. 5
• and many more...
Software security is a subjective notion varying with time and environment: depending on the point of view,
an application can be considered secure if no unwanted behavior (with respect to the security policy) did
ever happen, or will ever happen, or will ever happen as long as the application is properly maintained. Ex-
plicitly introducing the attacker in the equation makes it even more complex: the resources of the attacker
can make the difference between a secure application and an insecure one. For example, online shopping
websites usually protect their clients banking information with cryptography (AES, RC4, ...) to prevent this
information from being intercepted and possibly used to buy unwanted goods. While providing sufficient
security for lambda people, these cypherings are far from unbreakable when attacked via brute-force at-
tacks. In the same way as no lock is unbreakable, no software can be ultimately secure. Instead, security
is often the result of a cost-benefits trade-off : the level of security is raised high enough to, hopefully,
prevent any attacker from gaining access to sensitive elements without spending a disproportionate amount
of resources in the process.
Software security encompasses measures taken throughout the application’s life-cycle to prevent unwanted
behavior of the application and of the underlying system with respect to the security policy. These unwanted
behaviors can be caused by flaws in the design, development, deployment, upgrade, or maintenance of the
application.
But, where no architect could possibly have the idea to start building a bridge before proving his plans
correct according to laws of physics and current domain best-practices, many software developers still start
building software from scratch with little to no formal specification. This behavior makes it almost impos-
sible to fully guarantee that the resulting software system is secure according to the client’s requirements.
Most of the time, the security of the software system relies, on one hand, on the confidence of the client in
the provided tests on sample cases that the system has satisfied and, on the other hand, on an act of trust on
the developer abilities to produce secure systems. Of course, such a “security by trust” may not always be
satisfactory:
• the client might not want to engage his own name or liability in a software product that may leak his
own business private information.
• the developer might not be able to bear the liability of a security leak in his client facility. For in-
stance, the developer might not be able to insure himself at a reasonable price for potential liabilities
5apr. 2011 : http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/01/epsilon-idUSL3E7F13F420110401
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caused by his software in case of malfunction.
To avoid this problem, it is usually considered a best practice in computer science to specify as precisely
as possible the “key” features of the expected software system. This allows to check more in-depth the
software system features according to the required behavior, thus reducing as much as possible the trust
needed on the developer.
1.2.1 Identification, Authentication and Authorization
It is important, at this point, to clarify the notions of identification, authentification and authorization:
Identification is the capability to name without ambiguity a specific element. In a software context, the
identification of an object or a user is the mapping between this concept and its own logical represen-
tation. For instance, inserting a smartcard into a card reader or giving a username to the system are
identification methods; they allow the system to determine who is trying to access it.
Authentication is the process of verifying that the given identification is correct. It can take many forms:
challenging the smartcard, asking the user to give a password known only by the user and the system,
or any suitable method.
Authorization is the process of verifying that an identified and authenticated subject has then permission
to perform a given operation or access a specific resource on the system. Authorization often involves
checking the subject credentials against some defined rules.
In a security perspective, these three terms are strongly tied: authentication is useless without proper prior
identification and no authorization decision can be made if the subject is not properly identified and authen-
ticated first (figure 1.2).
It must be noted that, in many situations in computer science, identification is used without proper authen-
tication, resulting on systems based on mutual trust and/or providing very limited guarantees. For instance,
the SMTP protocol [Pos82], responsible for the delivery of emails over the internet, lets the sender freely
specify what the source adress is (the “From:” field of the SMTP header, see figure 1.1). The sender of the
mail can identify himself as whoever he wants without being asked for any authentication. SMTP servers
usually identify and authenticate users on their IP adresses : allowing mails from users located in their
dedicated subnetwork and refusing all others. If the recipient of a mail wants to verify that his newly re-
ceived email really originates from the declared sender, he must use external authentication methods like
phoning the expected sender for oral confirmation or asking the sender to cryptographically sign his mail.
This lack of authentication allows spam-bots to forge emails in an attempt to lure people into thinking the
email originates from a known friend or family member. Receivers of such mails are often less cautious on
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the mail content and may be more induced in following links to phishing or unwanted ads sites.
Date: Wed, 23 Feb 2011 12:13:02 +0100
From: God Himself <god@heaven.org>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Hubert Toussaint <hto@info.fundp.ac.be>
Subject: Forged from field !
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
(...)
Figure 1.1: Mail header with forged “From:” field.
The mail format, and the underlying SMTP protocol, makes no verification at
all on the validity of the information given in the header.
The rest of this document focuses on the authorization perspective. The problematics of the identification
and the authentication of subjects, already broadly covered by the literature, will be left aside. The interested
reader can find more informations on those topics in [US 85] and [And01].
1.3 Access Control
The next logical step after identifying and authenticating a user is to define precisely what he should be
authorized to do, i.e. what he should be able to access and what he should not. The set of operations
required for this process are usually grouped under the term “access-control”. This section introduces the
most commonly used models in the specification of ressource access.
The three key properties expected from an access-control policy are :
• confidentiality: private information must stay secret and private.
• integrity: information must be protected against unwanted modifications and/or modifications caused
by unauthorized user.
• availability: information must be accessible from where it is required.
By restricting the set of users able to access the information, access-control, if well configured, can guar-
antee confidentiality. The same holds for integrity: if only allowed users access the information, it is very
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unlikely that they will temper it. Availability is a little different: while it is obvious that a user allowed to
access the information has more ease to cause the system to malfunction than an external attacker, access-
control alone cannot guarantee availability. Distributed denial of services (DDOS) are an example of that
limitation: even without accessing the protected information on the server, a sufficiently large amount of
forged queries can take almost any server down, preventing legitimate users to access their required re-
source.
For a complete story on evolution of access-control, the reader is invited to consult [FKC03], [Tou06] and
[SSS94].
1.3.1 Basic elements
Before going any further in access-control policies, let’s clarify the notions of user, subject, permission,
operation and object and their relations in the context of access-control (figure 1.2):
User: a user refers to the person manipulating the system. Most of the time a single user can have several
virtual identities (for instance, multiple logins) and may want to access several of those at the same
time. Accurately matching users and subjects is the role of the identification/authentication routines.
Subject: a subject is the software process acting on behalf of the user. It represents the “virtual arm” of the
user, the only way it can access the software system.
Operation: an operation is a software process invoked by a subject on an object in the system.
Object: an object represents any software or hardware resource on the considered system. It may be
databases, peripherals, or memory areas for instance. Objects are typically viewed as passive enti-
ties, giving or receiving information. Some models support more complex objects like programs or
permissions.
Permission: a permission (also sometimes called a privilege) is an authorization for a specific subject to
perform a specific action on a specific object of the system. It consist in the combination of an object,
a subject and an operation. A permission can also depend on the context in which it is asked : some
operations may be allowed on certain hours, or only if certain conditions are met.
Aside from permissions authorizing (or not) some users to perform some actions on some objects, access-
control systems often try to achieve higher level properties like least-privilege or separation of duty.
• The least-privilege property states that a user should only be granted access to objects strictly required
to perform his duty, no more. It is often used to prevent unwanted information leaks. For instance,
in a banking environment, a cashier may be granted access on his clients accounts to perform their
operations when asked, but not on all the other client’s accounts and not outside office hours.
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Operation
Permission
User
ObjectSubject
Identification
Authentication
Authorization
Figure 1.2: Simple permission model
• Separation of duty on the other hand tries to enforce that some operations cannot be conducted to-
gether by a single subject. For instance, once again in a banking environment, a good practice could
be to allow a clerc to make paiements to customer and to approve (or not) what other clercs do. But
he should never be able to approve his own work.
1.3.2 Access Control Policy
An access-control policy is a set of rules defining which resources are accessible to which user, possibly
depending on the context of the action. It regroups all the individual permissions granted to the different
users of the system. The basic question it answers is “Who can do what and when”.
Independently of the constraints imposed by the chosen specification model and its implementation, the
definition of an access-control policy is a political choice before being a technological one. Considering
the access to a particular resource, several options are possible: ranging from only allowing access to users
requiring it to allowing access to any but some “forbidden” ones. Which one to choose depends on the
political and strategical choices of the organisation wherein they take place. The result also often depends
on a cost-benefits analysis: the more detailed the policy is, the more time it takes to write it and (most of
the time) the more complex it is to implement and manage.
Hereunder are presented the most prevalent access-control models found in current software systems: DAC,
MAC and RBAC. Readers interested by a more in-depth analysis of these models can consult [Tou06],
[Mor07], [HFK06] and [FSG+01].
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1.3.2.1 DAC
Discretionary Access Control, or DAC, defined by the US Department of Defense in the Trusted Computer
System Evaluation Criteria [US 85] “as a means of restricting access to objects based on the identity of
subjects and/or groups to which they belong. The controls are discretionary in the sense that a subject
with a certain access permission is capable of passing that permission (perhaps indirectly) on to any other
subject which they belong’” is an access-control model where subjects owning a particular permission can,
under certains circumstances, grant other subjects this permission (hence the name discretionary). The same
applies to the revocation of permissions.
A DAC access-control policy can be modelled as a permission-matrix (figure 1.3): assigning to each user
the set of permissions granted on a each object.
Subject Object 1 Object 2 Object 3 Object 4
Marc R,W,X R W
Paul X R,X
Pierre R,W,X
Figure 1.3: Permission matrix
Each user is granted a combination of read(R), write(W) and execute(X)
permissions on each object. The owner of an object can decide, at any time, to
grant/revoke any permission he wish to any user.
Such a system is easily customizable to reflect almost every possible policy choices. But, as soon as the
number of users and/or objects grows, the matrix becomes unmanageable. Any new object or new user on
the system requires the administrator to properly set his initial rights. Relying entirely on the object owners
to set permissions makes DAC systems very vulnerable to users’s mistakes and trojan attacks. Furthermore,
in this model, it is very complex to express properties like interdiction, role, task or context because the
permission matrix represents a statical view of the permission granted on the system.
To simplify a little bit the management of such a huge permission matrix, several enhancements to the
original model have been introduced. The first one is the notion of group: a group represents the set of
users belonging to that group. So instead of assigning to every user its permissions on every object, the
administrator has the choice to group users requiring similar privileges in groups and then to assign per-
missions directly to those groups (figure 1.4). Depending on the implementation, groups of groups may be
available or not. The most frequent implementation of DAC, as found on many UNIX systems, only allows
the specification of the permissions of the owner of the object, his group and to “others”, representing all
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the users of the system but the owner and the member of his group (figure 1.5).
Groups composition :
user:marc, pierre, fred, root
compta: marc, pierre
admin:root
Ressources
Group Object 1 Object 2 Object 3 Object 4
user R,W,X R W
compta R,W,X R,X
admin R,W,X R,W,X R,W,X R,W,X
Figure 1.4: Permission matrix based on groups
Subject ’marc’ is granted read(R) access on objects 1, 2 and 4. 1 and 2 as a
member of group “user”, 4 as a member of group “compta”’
concours:~# 
concours:~# 
concours:~# 
concours:~# ls -l /etc/shadow
-rw-r----- 1 root shadow 1899 Feb 16 16:42 /etc/shadow
concours:~# 
U G O U G
Figure 1.5: UNIX permission specification
The permissions on the file are expressed in terms of user permission (U), here
granting read(r) and write(w) access to user ’root’, group permission (G),
granting read(r) access to all members of the ’shadow’ group and others (O)
granting no permissions.
The concept of groups eases the specification of the policy, but makes it very complex to trace the origin
of one specific permission, which may be very important in the case where a change occurs in an user
authorization level. Each object belonging to this user and any group he is member of have to be checked
and eventually have their permissions updated to reflect the new situation.
Another enhancement of the classical DAC model are the Access-Control Lists (ACL). In an ACL policy,
permissions can be granted to groups and to specific users (figure 1.6 shows an ACL records taken from a
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Linux system). A user then receives all permissions granted to the groups he belongs to, plus the specific
permissions he has been personally granted.
# file: acldemo
# owner: root
# group: root
user::rw-
user:gsc:r-x
user:hto:rwx
user:pys:--x
group::---
group:staff:r-x
mask::rwx
other::---
Figure 1.6: Access-Control List (ACL)
The resource “acldemo” is accessible by :
• his owner, with read and write privilege.
• to the gsc, hto and pys users with their respective rights as specified.
• to all members of the “staff” group, with read and execute privilege.
• nobody else.
Despite being more flexible than flat groups specification, ACL tend to suffer from the same weaknesses:
adding new resources or users to the system or modifying a user authorization level still require a check of
all the resources he may have been granted access on which is often impractical and error-prone on systems
with a large number of objects.
1.3.2.2 MAC
At the opposite of the DAC model lies the Mandatory Access Control, or MAC, also defined in the Trusted
Computer System Evaluation Criteria [US 85] as "a means of restricting access to objects based on the
sensitivity (as represented by a label) of the information contained in the objects and the formal authoriza-
tion (i.e., clearance) of subjects to access information of such sensitivity". MAC is an access-control policy
model where the system restricts the ability of a user to perform an action on an object depending on their
respective “clearance” levels.
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In a MAC system, user are assigned a clearance level. The objects they are allowed to access and the way
they are allowed to access them depends on it. Summarized as a “no read up, no write down” policy, a
system implementing MAC will forbid users to read objects with a clearance level above their own and
to write information into objects with a clearance level strictly underneath their own. It should be noted
that the clearance levels of an user and an object mays not always be comparable : clearance levels can be
organized as lattices and/or only support a partial ordering. Figure 1.7 illustrates these constraints: subject
s1 can read o1, o2 and o3, but can’t write in any of them because their clearance levels are strictly below his
own, whereas subject s2 can read o3, write o1 and read/write o1.
read
s1
s2 o1
o2
o3
Clearance level
write
Figure 1.7: Illustration of MAC policy
The clearance level assigned to each subject and objects limits what
operations can be applied.
It is important to note that, in opposition to what DAC systems do, a MAC system does not allow a user
to modify the permissions attached to the objects he manipulates. In a MAC system, objects are created
with a specific clearance level which cannot be changed; otherwise the security of the whole system may
be compromised.
For a long time, MAC systems have only be used in domains where security is critical, like military subsys-
tems or nuclear power plants. More recently, new implementations have been incorporated in mainstream
operating systems like Linux (with the incorporation of SELinux in kernel 2.6.x) and Windows (with the
Mandatory Integrity Control incorporated into Windows Vista and newer).
While being able to guarantee a high protection of the security of the data through the system enforcement
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of the authorization, the MAC model suffers from some drawbacks. The major one is his stiffness: MAC
systems do not allow clearance levels of objects to be modified, making it very difficult to support evolution
of contexts. In the same way, adding a new user or a new object to the system impose to determine very
precisely what its clearance should be, which may not be easy on large systems or dynamic organisations.
1.3.2.3 RBAC
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), based on the work of David Ferraiolo and Richard Kuhn [FK92], is
an access-control model that breaks the direct mapping between a subject and the object contained in the
permission.
To overcome the problems occurring when trying to manage large DAC permission sets and the stiffness
of the MAC model, the RBAC model introduces the concept of role inside the permission relation (see
figure 1.8, to be compared with figure 1.2 illustrating the permission). A user gains access to an object,
not by some permission he’s been personally granted, but only through the roles he has at the time the ac-
cess is made. This allow to easily update the set of users and/or the set of objects without the need to verify
the full set of possible permissions. Only the (smaller) set of roles has to be checked and eventually adapted.
role n
user
subject object
operationrole 1
role 2
role 3
Figure 1.8: Illustration of RBAC policy
The direct link between a subject, an operation and an object (the permission)
is now broken with the introduction of the notion of role.
A formal definition of the RBAC model was given by Ferraiolo and Kuhn in their original paper [FK92]
and its followers. That definition wasn’t provided to allow formal reasoning but to clarify some of the am-
biguities found in different implementations of their model (see original citation in figure 1.9).
This formal model does not clarify all the ambiguities found on different implementations: RBAC is born
from a conjunction of industrial implementations and had to be unified before being called a standard. But
CHAPTER 1. SOFTWARE SECURITY 15
“(...) This article is a first attempt to develop an authoritative definition of well-
accepted RBAC features for use in authorization management systems. Although
RBAC continues to be an evolving technology, the RBAC features that were chosen
to be included within this proposed standard represent a stable and well-accepted set
of features, and are known to be included within a breadth of commercial products
and reference implementations.”
Figure 1.9: Motivation for the formal definition of RBAC [FK92]
the formal model had to include all of the commercial implementations available at that time, otherwise it
wouldn’t have been able to federate all of the RBAC users. Furthermore, RBAC still evolves: for instance
with the addition of new concepts like inheritance or separation of roles. Or with the removal of some crit-
icized features like the notion of session (see [LBB05] for a complete story on the removal of this feature).
Presented in one of the last version of the RBAC specification [FKC03], the formal specification of the
RBAC model is based on four main concepts : users, roles, operations and objects (figure 1.10):
• USERS, ROLES, OPS and OBS are, respectively, the considered set of users, roles, operations
and objects.
• UA ⊆ USERS×ROLES, is a many to many mapping between the users and the roles. It represents
the assignment of roles to the different users.
• assigned_users : (r : ROLES)→ 2USERS ; assigned_users(r) = {u ∈ USERS|(u, r) ∈ UA}:
is the mapping of a role to the set of users acting it.
• PRMS ⊆ OPS ×OBS, is the set of permissions.
• PA ⊆ PRMS ×ROLES, represents the set of permissions granted to each role.
• assigned_permissions(r : ROLES)→ 2PRMS ; assigned_permissions(r) = {p ∈ PRMS|(p, r) ∈ PA},
is the mapping of a role r to the set of permission it grants.
• SUBJECT , is the set of subjects.
• subject_user(s : SUBJECT )→ USERS, is the mapping between a subject and the correspond-
ing user.
• subject_roles(s : SUBJECT ) → 2ROLES , is the mapping between a subject and the set of his
roles (more formally : subject_roles(s) ⊆ {r ∈ ROLES|(subject_user(s), r) ∈ UA}).
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From there, the authors define the concept of authorization as :
s : SUBJECT, op : OPS, o : OBS
access(s, op, o) =⇒ ∃r : ROLES, p : PERMS : r ∈ subject_roles(s)
∧ p ∈ assigned_permissions(r)
∧ (op, o) ∈ p
Specifying that a subject s is granted access on an object o to perform an operation op if there exists a role
r, currently owned by s, which opens the right to this permission.
OPSUSERS ROLES
UA PA
PRMS
OBS
Figure 1.10: Formal model of the core RBAC features (taken from [FKC03])
The way a user can be granted a new role and the conditions under which this can happen are unspecified
in this model: the reason is that the behavior of implemented systems differ on this particular point. To
prevent one or more systems from being excluded from the standard, this element was removed from the
specification. The same holds for the notions of inheritance, management of the decision points, ...
More informations on RBAC and all its evolutions can be found on the dedicated NIST website [NIS06]. A
detailed description of all the proposed evolutions of the RBAC standard is available in [SFK00].
1.3.2.4 ODRL
DAC, MAC, and RBAC models, while being used extensively in the industry for decades for the specifica-
tion and implementation of access-control systems, often show their weaknesses when they are confronted
with a distributed and dynamic environment. The implementations behind the different models often use
vendor-specific adaptations and optimization, causing interoperability problems. Furthermore, the fast evo-
lution of some access-control usages, like the finer usage-control introduced with Digital Rights Manage-
ment (DRM), showed the limitations of these classical models. With DRM’s, each user can be granted
specific permissions, possibly depending on the context where the usage of the resource takes place. For
instance, it is not uncommon to see permissions like “ Alice is allowed to listen to audio file bob.mp3, on
her own mp3-player, up to 5 times during the first 7 days after the date the file was purchased ” .
CHAPTER 1. SOFTWARE SECURITY 17
While classical access-control models attempt to solve the “Who can do what” question, DRM and usage-
control approaches require a more fine-grained answer taking into account the context and the potential
consequences of the operation. As such, usage-control attempts to solve the “Who can do what in wich
context and with which consequences” question.
The Open Digital Rights Language Initiative (ODRL) [ini11] attempts to provide a solution to this issue.
Defining themselves as “an international effort aimed at developing and promoting an open standard for
policy expressions. ODRL provides flexible and interoperable mechanisms to support transparent and inno-
vative use of digital content in publishing, distribution and consumption of digital media across all sectors
and communities.” , the ODRL initiative introduced a permission model explicitly taking into account the
different conditions in which the access is granted or forbidden.
Figure 1.11: ODRL Core Model Version 2.0 [ini11]
Figure 1.11 shows the graphical specification of the core of the ODRL v2.0 model6. In the ODRL model,
6Version 2.0 of the ODRL standard is still a draft specification at the time of writing. The current status of the draft is available on
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a policy is composed of a set of permissions and prohibitions (negative permissions), each of them repre-
senting the ability to perform an action on an asset in a specific context. Comparing with the classical DAC
permission model from figure 1.2 or with the RBAC permission model from figure 1.10, the main addition
are the notions of constraints, duty and party: the ODRL model explicitly expresses the set of constraints
that must be satisfied for the permission (or prohibition) to take place. A permission can also be conditioned
by the realisation of some duty (for example “pay 1 euro for each viewing of the movie” ). The model
also specifies, via the “party” element, who imposes the expressed constraints and duty and who grants the
permission and prohibition.
1.3.3 Access Control Policy Verification
Once the access-control policy has been defined, whatever the formalism used, arise the questions of
whether or not the declared policy :
1. precisely reflects the intended security policy. Said otherwise, do the access-control expressions
written in the produce model properly reflect the author’s intent ?
2. is complete, i.e. is the access-control policy precise enough to decide in a non ambiguous way, in any
situation, whether or not an access should be granted.
3. and is coherent with itself, i.e. in no circumstances can the policy provide two opposite decisions in
the same context.
While the first question can only be through the experience and knowledge of the policy creator, the two lat-
ter questions can benefit from helper processes. The question of whether policies are complete and coherent
has been quite extensively studied both formally (see for instance [GRS04] for the formal model-checking
of access-control policies) and in more practical ways (see [TKS05] and [YTB07])
The answers to these questions, and the confidence level associated with these answers, defines the level of
security to be expected from the application implementing the considered policy. In the same way as it is
almost impossible to build strong and steady buildings on swamps, only a strong and well-defined security
policy can lead to the production of secure software.
1.3.4 Access Control Policy Enforcement
The specification of the access-control policy does not, in itself, make the application secure. Only a strict
conformance of the implementation to the specified rules can guarantee that the resulting application really
the ODRL website : [ini11].
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fulfills its requirements.
Some standards, like XACML [OAS05], explicitly specify which components of a possibly distributed
system should decide wether an access request is granted or not. Unfortunately, the level of conformance
of a software system to the original policy may depend on many factors :
• the capacity and understanding of the application developers to implement precisely what was speci-
fied.
• the chosen implementation language which may not support all the required security primitives, or
may mis-implement some of them.
• physical constraints induced by the hardware platform designed to run the software system.
• time and cost mobilized for the verification of the conformance of the system.
• and many more...
The effect of some of these factors can be controlled to be maintained as low as possible, for instance using
certified developers, verified implementation languages, extensive conformance testing. But it is usually
very difficult to prove that, on the resulting software system, the implemented access-control model is ex-
actly the same as the specified one, no more no less. Testing the system in sample cases can help, but only
provides limited confidence on the conformance to the model, not certitudes.
1.4 Application Security
Building a secure application with its companion security model requires the precise identification of the
elements it should be protected from. That’s where the application security analysis comes into the play. The
notion of “application security” regroups the capacity for an application to deal with abnormal situations.
It is often expressed in terms of assets, threats, vulnerabilities, attacks and countermeasures.
Asset: A resource of value such as the data in a database or on the file system, or a
system resource.
Threat: A negative effect.
Vulnerability: A weakness that makes a threat possible.
Attack: An action taken to harm an asset.
Countermeasure: A safeguard that addresses a threat and mitigates risk.
As for the access-control model specification, defining a secure application is a complex task. Aside from
some obvious security vulnerabilities that will affect any user of the software system (for instance, an un-
protected database access), most of the security vulnerabilities depend on the context in which the system
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is operated. The same vulnerability may be critical for one user while being unimportant to another. These
two users will build very different definitions of what a secure application should be in their specific case.
Even worse: specifying the “perfect” (if it exists) security policy during the requirements analysis stage
does not guarantee that the resulting application will be secure at all: developers may mis-implement some
parts of it or the environment of the application can evolve in ways that breaks some of the hypothesis on
which the security policy is built.
Furthermore, the software development process itself is far from a simple and unequivocal task: developers
can introduce bugs, unwanted side-effects, or more simply misunderstanding of the security policy or of the
effect of the access-control primitives. Benign code modifications apparently unrelated to access-control
may create side-effects introducing flaws in the implemented security policy that may not be trivial to detect.
1.4.1 Norms and best practices
As it is already the case in many engineering fields, common knowledge, previous experiences and best
practices have been compiled into knowledge bases in order to assist as much as possible the developer in
the delicate task of producing secure software. Be they internal to the development team or publicly avail-
able documents produced by national or internationals bodies, all of these documents attempt to standardize
the field they apply to. This allows to pinpoint the critical aspects of the considered development process
and to choose the most suitable methods to reach them.
In the software engineering field, the Common Criteria [CCR11] are a compilation of definitions and
methodologies aiming at the production of secure software. They define both the development frame-
work and the reference documents to be produced. The Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL1 through EAL7)
of an IT product or system is a numerical grade assigned following the completion of a Common Criteria
security evaluation. The increasing assurance levels reflect added assurance requirements that must be met
to achieve certification. The intent of the higher levels is to provide higher confidence that the system’s
principal security features are reliably implemented. The 7 EAL levels are commonly labelled as :
• EAL1: Functionally Tested
• EAL2: Structurally Tested
• EAL3: Methodically Tested and Checked
• EAL4: Methodically Designed, Tested, and Reviewed
• EAL5: Semiformally Designed and Tested
• EAL6: Semiformally Verified Design and Tested
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• EAL7: Formally Verified Design and Tested
To achieve a particular EAL, the computer system must meet specific assurance requirements. Most of these
requirements involve design documentation, design analysis, functional testing, or penetration testing. The
higher EALs involve more detailed documentation, analysis, and testing than the lower ones.
• EAL1 to EAL3 basicaly consist in the production of adapted documentation together with the code.
They usually do not require in-depth development usage changes.
• EAL4 lies inbetween the lower levels, mainly dedicated to the documentation of the project and the
upper level, where more formal verifications will be required. This level requires to employ more
rigorous techniques than the previous ones, but does not yet enforce the usage of security-dedicated
verification tools. As an illustration of this category, most commercial user-level operating systems
lie around EAL4 level.
• Higher EAL levels, labelled EAL5 to EAL7, stregthen the requirements of formal verification of
some / all aspects of the code, progressively replacing the trust in the good design by proofs of good
design. For instance, the definition of the highest EAL7 level, states :
“EAL7 provides assurance by a full security target and an analysis of the security
functional requirements in that security target, using a functional and complete inter-
face specification, guidance documentation, the design of the target of evaluation, and
a structured presentation of the implementation to understand the security behavior.
Assurance is additionally gained through a formal model of select target of evaluation
security policies and a semiformal presentation of the functional specification and tar-
get of evaluation design. A modular, layered and simple target of evaluation security
function design is also required.” (adapted from [CCR11])
The highest security levels (in the Common Criteria), EAL-5 to EAL-7, require formal verification (or at
least validation) of the specification documents and of some of the software constructs. An example of
the application of the Common Criteria’s recommandations to a development project can be consulted in
[KS06].
It should be noted that the EAL level does not measure the security of the system itself, it simply states at
what level the system was tested or verified. Furthermore, the confidence to be given to the EAL obtained
by the considered software system should always be relative to the confidence in the authority providing
the certification. EALs should not be viewed as pure theoretical evaluations, but as a mix of trust and quan-
tifiable elements.
Other norms and best practices compilation frequently encountered in the software development field in-
cludes the work of the International Organization for Standardization7, for instance with the ISO 27000-
7http://www.iso.org/
22 CHAPTER 1. SOFTWARE SECURITY
family norms applying to “the security techniques applicable in the information technology field in order to
manage the security of information management system”.
The next chapter will focus on the software development process and on methods used to maintain the im-
plementation as close as possible to the specified access-control policy.
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This chapter presents the current set of techniques / methodologies aimed at avoiding or limiting the impact
of vulnerabilities on the resulting software system. Identifying the possible vulnerabilities is the very first
step towards a secure software system.
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2.1 Vulnerabilities of secure software development
The first step toward secure software development is to identify what are the main vulnerabilities threat-
ening software systems. This section covers the main source of vulnerabilities affecting the development
phase of the software development cycle. These vulnerabilities usually occur in three contexts: incorrect or
incomplete specification, forgotten features and unwanted extra-features.
An incorrect / incomplete specification is a specification where some elements either conflict (incorrect
specification) or are missing (incomplete specification). A specification can be made incorrect when a
newly added feature conflicts with a previous one. When detected, such conflicts can usually be dismissed
by adapting the set of rules to remove the conflit. For example (figure 2.1), the specification of a medical
record management system could state that “no one should be able to read someone else’s record” (A)
and, at the same time, that “a practitioner should be able to read/write his patient’s records” (B). De-
pending on the understanding of the developers, implementing these two rules will lead to a system where
at least one of them will be broken as soon as a practitioner will try to consult one of his patients’ records.
Allowing the access would break rule A while refusing it would break rule B. Once detected, the incompati-
bility between these two rules can be resolved by updating the requirements on this specific point according
to the user’s choice. In this example, we could give priority to the seconde rule (the B one), thus choosing
the upper result on the figure and allowing practitioners to consult their patient’s records.
A : 
B : 
A+B : ? 
+
Figure 2.1: Incorrect / incomplete specification
The overlapping between the two conflicting rules must be resolved before
starting implementation, otherwise the behavior of the system may be
unpredictable on this point.
However, detecting conflicting rules is not always that simple: conflicts can occur when updating the rule
set, or when performing apparently harmless operations, like reformatting the source code for pretty print-
ing. Even worse, such conflicts may not exhibit harmful effects during the testing stage, leading to the
delivery of a flawed system.
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A forgotten feature is a feature that, although being specified, is not implemented in the application. There
can be many causes to this absence: the feature may have been temporarily disabled during the development
cycle because its implementation conflicts with some other on-development feature, or because the feature
was skipped by the developers. The consequence is that the feature is not present in the final product and if
its behavior is not properly verified or tested, the absence may not be detected before it shows effects. For
instance, developers might be tempted to disable the firewall protecting the access to the servers during the
development stage : at that point the systems are running in a protected environment where firewall may
not be useful. Removing it will limit the possible interferences with the currently on-development software,
but it will expose the system if it is not properly re-enabled before the testing and deployment stages.
Unwanted extra features are the exact opposite of forgotten features: they are features introduced during
the development cycle that are not present in the specification but still appear in the final application. They
may be introduced deliberately by the developers (for instance, a debug interface that was added to help
diagnose some unwanted behavior and that has not been removed after use), result in a misunderstanding
of the specification or be a consequence of the usage of a software library. Libraries often provide a set of
features to an application, some of which may be superfluous. Being out of the specification, these extra-
features are quite hard to detect: validation steps may not expose them because such verifications are based
on the behaviors specified, not on what is really implemented. This may result in breaches in the security
of the application as these extra features are neither checked nor monitored.
A special case of these vulnerabilities is the bug. A bug is an error in the software system, usually unwill-
ingly inserted by a developer. Depending on his exact impact, a bug can be seen as any of the last two
categories given above: a forgotten feature when the bug causes some part of the implementation to mal-
function / not function at all and a extra feature when it causes unwanted behavior of the software system.
All of these vulnerabilities can cause the software system to exhibit behaviors that are out of the speci-
fication, possibly resulting in security flaws. To prevent such problems from happening, or to limit their
impact when they are hardly avoidable, multiple methods have been proposed. The following sections will
introduce the concept of secure software development as well as some of the main techniques used to detect
and limit the impacts of existing vulnerabilities.
2.2 Software development cycle
The software development cycle refers to the set of stages required to obtain a software system. It ranges
from the collection and analysis of the user’s requirements to the delivery and maintenance of the software
system. Refining a little further, the software development cycle can be divided in 5 interdependent stages :
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requirement analysis : the collection and analysis of the user’s requirements.
specification : the formalisation of the user’s requirements and the selection and de-
sign of the according software system’s feature.
program implementation : the traduction of the specification into the chosen imple-
mentation language.
system testing : the evaluation of the conformance of the software system against the
specification.
maintenance : the deployment, the correction of vulnerabilities and the adaptation
of the software system to his changing environment and/or to the new/modified
user’s requirement.
The granularity of this decomposition is arbitrary : depending on the focus, each of these stages can be
refined into smaller task-oriented elements (think of the “system testing” stage, which could be decom-
posed into “unit testing”, “integration testing”, “system integration” and “full system testing”). For clarity
purposes, the rest of this chapter will be limited to the 5-stages decomposition presented above.
Although these stages represent a logical progression from the user’s requirements toward a running and
maintained software system, their sequence is usually more complex: at each stage of the development
process, developers might be tempted to revoke some of the options taken before, either because this would
simplify their current work, or because the elements justifying these choices have been modified. If un-
controlled, this can lead to a cascade of changes, turning the development process in a never-ending story
(figure 2.2).
The following sections will introduce the most prevalent models decomposing the software development
cycle. The reader interested in a more in-depth analysis of the software development cycle and its implica-
tions should consult [Pfl01].
2.2.1 Waterfall model
In the waterfall model [Roy70], the set of stages required to obtain a software system are ordered into a
strict sequence, leading to a stair-like model (figure 2.3). In this model, derived from the physical good
manufacturing process, each stage is due to provide a deliverable on completion.
As the figure illustrates, each development stage must be completed before the next one begins. This model
is very simple to follow and to explain to a user : the current activity is easily viewable, as well as the job
already done and the upcoming activities. As such, the waterfall model was the basis for software develop-
ment deliverables in the US. Dept. of Defense for many years [US 88].
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Requirements 
analysis
Specification
Program 
ImplementationSystem Testing
Maintenance
Figure 2.2: Uncontrolled development
An uncontrolled re-evaluation of the options taken can lead to an infinite loop
in the development cycle.
Requirements 
analysis
Specification
Program 
Implementation
System Testing
Maintenance
Figure 2.3: Waterfall model
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However, such a strict ordering of the different stages has one major drawback : it leaves no way, in stage
N , to modify, correct or update what has been done in stage N − 1 or above. This makes it almost impossi-
ble to reflect late changes in user’s requirements or environment modification. It leaves no place for errors
or evolution: in software development, the requirements usually evolve during the development phase, re-
flecting the knowledge of the problem gained and the already evaluated alternatives.
To allow a limited degree of modification to the deliverables of the previous stages while keeping the devel-
opment process under control, upgrades to the waterfall models appeared, like de V-shaped model (German
Ministry of Defense, 1992). In the V-shaped model (figure 2.4), testing activities are explicitly related to
the analysis and design stages, allowing a limited level of correction of the previous stages while limiting
as much as possible the risks of infinite iterations inside the model.
Requirements 
analysis
Specification
Program 
Implementation
System Testing
Maintenance / 
Evolution
Design Verification
Validate Requirements
Figure 2.4: V-shaped model
Waterfall-like models are usually used in contexts where requirements are very stable, removing the need
to update them during the development process, or in contexts where time and/or cost-constraints forbid
such backward steps. For instance for systems required to be operational as soon as possible, even if the
full features will only be reached after a strong maintenance phase.
2.2.2 Prototyping model
In order to limit the possibly infinite recursion of the uncontrolled development model (figure 2.2) without
restricting too much the ability to revoke any options taken in the previous stages, the prototyping model
allows all or part of a system to be constructed quickly to understand or clarify issued [Pfl01]. In a similar
way to physical goods engineering, each produced prototype is evaluated and the feed-back is integrated
CHAPTER 2. SECURE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT 29
back into the next generation of prototypes (figure 2.5).
Requirements Prototype requirement Design
Impleme
ntation Tests
Feed-back
Prototype #1
Prototype 
requirement Design
Impleme
ntation Tests
Prototype #2
Feed-back
Prototype 
requirement Design
Impleme
ntation Tests
Prototype #N
(...)
Figure 2.5: Prototype model
Each prototype implements a subset of the requirements, augmented by any
useful feed-back gathered on the previous prototypes.
Prototypes can be built on a specific subset of the requirements, in order to test a possible implementation
and/or to gather more efficient feed-back on them, or created incrementally: each prototype implementing
a few more requirements than its predecessor. In both cases, prototyping allows developers to better un-
derstand the challenges involved and to obtain an easier feed-back from the users. Users are usually more
comfortable to clarify their requirements when confronted to a partial version of the software system than
when presented a formal specification.
The main drawback of the prototyping approach lies in the time and resources taken to develop the succes-
sive prototypes, which may sometimes exceed the time and resources required for a more “straight to the
point” approach of the same project.
When working over a growing set of requirements instead of a specific one, the prototyping approach
closely compares to iterative and incremental development (figure 2.6) where features are either added one
at a time (incremental development) or progressively implemented in the software system (iterative devel-
opment).
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Iterative Development
Incremental Development
Figure 2.6: Incremental Vs Iterative development.
The methods based on prototyping proved very popular due to the rapid production of deliverables, allow-
ing a quick feed-back from the user, thus limiting the impact of misunderstandings on his requirements.
The same applies to conformance testing : each prototype can be tested on the restricted set of requirements
it should implement, showing directly the elements to be corrected/improved instead of having to wait for
the system to be fully developed and tested near the end of the development phase.
2.2.3 Practical software development cycle
The practical software development cycle usually differs from the classical approaches presented in the
above sections : customers do change their mind between the requirement definition stage and the delivery
of the software system, developers do make errors while implementing the requirements, environnement
can change, time and cost constraints restrain the validations that can be made... All of these causes the
sequence of stages required to build the system to change to an iterative-like process. Figure 2.7 presents
these potential modifications in the case of an adapted waterfall model, but all the other software develop-
ment models suffer from the same problems. A software system is not built in an isolated environment but
must take into account changes occurring around it, so should the software development process.
This iterative process has great consequences on the requirements of the software system: each of the mod-
ifications adopted at every stage must be reflected to the original requirements document, which would
otherwise become obsolete. However, experience shows that, when confronted to such requirements modi-
fications, developers tend to dedicate their time and effort to the production of the code designed to imple-
ment them rather than to the updating of the original specification. Unless in critical contexts where security
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Requirements 
analysis
Specification
Program 
Implementation
System Testing
Maintenance
Environment
Customer
Figure 2.7: Practical software development cycle.
Each stage is influenced by the changing customer’s requirements and the
environment, possibly causing the need to revoke some of the decisions taken
on the previous stages.
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flaws cannot be tolerated, customers are often more willing to pay for systems covering their needs, even if
they may contain potential security problems, that for secure systems completely useless in their business
because some of the key features sought are not yet implemented.
2.3 Secure Software Engineering
In an attempt to meet these two apparently opposite focuses, secure software engineering techniques have
been developed. These techniques aim at the production of secure code and its verification. Some of these
techniques can guarantee that the resulting code is fully vulnerability-free while others only focus on some
specific aspects of the program or return partial results.
There are basically two ways to produce code that is proved secure: either build code through methods
guaranteeing its security (the generation approach), or build code and prove it secure (the verification ap-
proach). The rest of this section will introduce examples of these two approaches as well as their main
advantages and drawbacks.
2.3.1 Secure code generation
Secure code generation aims at the production of secure code by deriving the source code more or less
directly from a higher-level model, directly derived from the specification. The actions possible for the
developer are strictly supervised and limited in order to guarantee that any code produced through this kind
of method satisfy the properties specified in the model.
We’ll present here two examples of secure code generation methodologies : the B method [Abr96], which
helps to formally refine a specification down to executable code, and Aspect Oriented Programming (AOP)
[KLM+97] where transversal features can almost automatically be inserted into the executable code, re-
moving unwanted developer interaction. Although both techniques aim at the production of secure code,
they differ in the way they convert the expressed requirements into executable code and in the level of free-
dom of choices they leave to the developers .
2.3.1.1 B method
The B method, defined by J-R. Abrial in [Abr96], is a tool-supported formal method where the specifica-
tion of a software system is progressively refined into executable code. The refinement process is strictly
supervised so the properties expressed on a stage cannot be violated in subsequents ones. The objectives of
the B-method, as stated on [Cle11], are :
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• To create correct software by construction
• To model systems in their environment
• To formalize specifications
• To simplify programming
To prevent the occurrence of the vulnerabilities presented in section 1, the B-method imposes a strict de-
velopment process (figure 2.8). First, the specification is expressed in a formal model called the abstract
machine. This formal model specifies the high level goals the software system should meet. Then refine-
ments of this abstract machine are produced. Each of the refinements clarifies one of the goals or provides
a more concrete implementation of the required properties. It must then be proved to be coherent and to in-
clude all the properties of the Abstract Machine and of the previous refinements. At the end of the process,
the refinement is fine and deterministic enough to be automatically translated into an executable language.
The B-method as been used in some safety-critical systems like the Ariane 5 rocket and the underground
line 14 in Paris [Cle11].
Abstract 
Machine
Refinement 
#1
Refinement 
#2
Refinement 
#N
Implementation
(...)
Figure 2.8: B-method.
The initial requirements, expressed as an abstract machine, are progressively
refined into executable code while conserving the initial properties.
To illustrate the B-method, let’s build a simple integer multiplication application. The abstract machine
shown in figure 2.9 formalizes the simple requirements. It describes a simple model, containing only one
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operation : mult(· · · ). This operation requires two parameters (a and b) and is only defined if both of them
are naturals (the PRE-condition clause). The result of the mult(a, b) operation is simply the product of
a and b. A possible implementation of this abstract machine is presented in figure 2.10: the body of the
mult(a, b) operation has been refined into an algorithmic version of the multiplication operator. As the
second machine refines the first one according to the B-framework, the methodology guarantees that any
property required on the abstract machine still holds in the refined version.
1 MODEL
2 Mult
3 OPERATIONS
4 res <-- mult(a,b) =
5 PRE a : NAT & b : NAT
6 THEN res := a*b
7 END
8 END
Figure 2.9: B Abstract machine for the multiplication application
1 IMPLEMENTATION
2 MultImpl
3 OPERATIONS
4 res <-- mult(a,b) =
5 r:=a;
6 q:=0;
7 WHILE r>=b
8 DO q:=q+1; r:=r-b
9 INVARIANT r+(q*b) = a
10 VARIANT r
11 END
12 END
Figure 2.10: B implementation of the multiplication application
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However, the B-method is far from being the universal panacea to prevent security issues from happening
in software development. Using the B-method requires the developers to completely change the way they
work: a B developer never writes code, he merely writes specifications (abstract machines) and refines them.
This change of habits and the time dedicated to the experiencing of the methodology and its formalisms
cause a huge time and cost overhead before any executable code can be written. The other huge drawback
lies in the stiffness of the approach : once the abstract machine has been written, no change to the specified
requirements is possible without losing all the already produced refinements. Late customers requirements
and/or environnement changes are very hard to include. For these reasons, the B-method is usually reserved
for projects with very stable requirements and where security is a critical factor and for companies able to
cope with the high cost of entry to this methodology.
Further informations on the B-method can be found in [Abr96] and [Cle11]. A concrete application of the
B methodology into the field of access-control is available in [Had05] and [DHM09] (in French).
2.3.1.2 Aspect Oriented Programming
Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP) [KLM+97] is a methodology designed to increase the modularity of
the code. The main idea is to separate cross-cutting concerns from the rest of the code. The interest of AOP
in the context of the secure code generation lies in the fact that AOP allows the developer to implement
key security elements in one unique place and then automatically replicate/adapt that code in every code
portions that requires it. It should be noted that AOP in itself does not guarantee to produce secure code
at all, it only helps to reduce errors and makes the security measures implementations more uniform. It
imposes little to no verification to what the implemented aspect do. A popular implementation of the AOP
methodology is the AspectJ framework [Asp], developed for the Java programming language.
The places in the code where the cross-cutting concerns are to be inserted are called pointcuts, they can de-
scribe almost any constructs of the Java language : method calls, method executions, objects initialisation,
constructor calls, exceptions being thrown, access to attributes,...
An illustration of the AOP methodology can be found in figures 2.11 and 2.12 (example adapted from
[Mon09]). Figure 2.11 presents the source code of a Java class representing the Account of a bank client.
This class only contains business logic. Adding a logging feature to this class (and to all the other compos-
ing the software system) would require to edit each and every single class to add the corresponding method
call. This error-prone process can be replaced by the specification of the logging component as an aspect
(i.e. a transversal concern). Figure 2.12 shows a possible definition of such an aspect. Lines 4 and 5 define
the join points where this aspect will apply; here on the creation of an Account object and on any method
call outside of the Logging component. Lines 7 to 15 then define when and how the different aspect items
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implementation should be inserted into the code. For instance, applying the aspect specified on line 7 to the
class source code would produce the result show in figure 2.13.
1 public class Account {
2 private int number;
3 private int balance;
4
5 public Account(int number) { this.number = number;}
6
7 public void credit(int amount) { balance = balance + amount;}
8
9 public boolean debit(int amount) {
10 if (amount > balance) return false;
11 balance = balance - amount;
12 return true;
13 }
14
15 public int getBalance() { return balance;}
16 }
Figure 2.11: Source code for the Account class.
AOP allows for easy and quick insertion of transversal features into the code, removing the risk of mis-
implementation of the invocations of these features. It allows developers to focus on business logic inside
the code and concentrate cross-cutting concerns like logging, encryption or access-control in small and
manageable components instead of scattering them throughout the source code. From a validation point of
view, AOP in itself does not guarantee any improvement in the security of the code produced. It relies on
the correctness of the implementation of the aspects to be inserted. However, as the aspects are disjoints
from the code, they allow for easy insertion/update/correction of their content without the need to check the
whole source code.
In order to ease the transition from standard code to an AOP-style one, recent works attempt to convert the
most frequent constructs into aspects. See for instance [TNTN11] for an application of to the access-control
of Java applications.
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1 public aspect Logging {
2 Logger logger = Logger.getLogger("simple_logger");
3
4 pointcut accountCreation() : execution (Account.new(..));
5 pointcut methodCall() : execution (* *.*(..)) && !whithin (Logger);
6
7 after() : accountCreation() { logger.info("New Account");}
8 before() : methodCall() {
9 Signature sig = thisJoinPointStaticPart.getSignature();
10 logger.trace("Entering "+sig.getName());
11 }
12 after() : methodCall() {
13 Signature sig = thisJoinPointStaticPart.getSignature();
14 logger.trace("Leaving "+sig.getName());
15 }
16 }
Figure 2.12: AOP : logging aspect specification
1 public Account(int number) { this.number = number;}
2 +
3 after() : accountCreation() { logger.info("New Account");}
4 =
5 public Account(int number) {
6 logger.info("New Account");
7 this.number = number;
8 }
Figure 2.13: Aspect insertion
Effect of the application of rule 7 from figure 2.12 onto the Account object
defined in figure 2.11.
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2.3.1.3 Common drawbacks
While being very different, the two presented approaches share most of the pitfalls of the code generation
methods. They both require developers to express the requirements of the system in a formalism quite dif-
ferent from the source code languages they are used to. Thus requiring developers to learn and experience
new formalisms and tools; a process that takes time and consumes some of the resources of the company
for “non immediately productive” work.
Another significative drawback is that the generated code is not meant to be easily human-readable and
understandable. More than that, the generated code should never be manually edited : otherwise the proper-
ties granted by the code generation approach may be compromised. So the developer loses control over his
code. Although he is still the one responsible for the possibly erroneous behaviors his code might exhibit,
the developer has no direct way to verify that the generated code does not insert unwanted features inside his
code. Only the confidence on the tool author and/or on the widely deployed methodology can help him here.
2.3.2 Secure code verification
Taking the opposite way of the secure code generation techniques, code verification methods are developed
to check that source/executable code, produced by any means, does satisfy the expressed requirements.
The verification approach is built around two techniques : formal verification and code testing. The for-
mal verification techniques build a model from the interpretation of the source code, often with the help of
dedicated annotations, and checks the conformance of this model against some desired properties. On the
other hand, the code testing techniques derive test cases from the requirements and check if the expected
and observed behaviors of the system match while executing those test cases.
2.3.2.1 Verification
Code verification techniques aim at proving that a semantic model built from the considered source code
satisfies the expressed requirements. They are dedicated to the identification of possible inconsistencies
between the specification and the implemented code. They range from frameworks dedicated to specific
inconsistencies detection (like the Valgrind tool [Sew11] dedicated to the discovery of memory errors) to
more general methods adaptable to many situations (see for instance the Verifast tool suite [JSP+11a],
[JSP11b] or the Java PathFinder initiative [HP98], [NAS]).
These verification techniques can usually be grouped in 3 categories [DKW08] : abstract interpretation,
model-checking and bounded model-checking. Static analysis encompasses a family of techniques for au-
tomatically computing information about the behavior of a program without executing it. On the other hand,
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model-checking techniques attempt to determine if a correctness property holds by exhaustively exploring
the reachable states of a program and, if not, generate a counterexample or an execution trace leading to a
state in which the property is violated. As the state-space of software programs is typically too large to be
analyzed directly, model-checking algorithms are usually applied either on abstract versions of the software
system (symbolic model checking) or on the full state-space but with a depth-bounded approach (bounded
model-checking).
Abstract interpretation techniques quite rapidly show their limitation when the verification of large existing
software systems is concerned : they are known to be computationally hard [Ric53] and are practically
impossible to do in most modern languages. In the following, we will focus on model-checking techniques,
both symbolic and bounded ones.
All of these model-checking methods share the same process (figure 2.14): the code is abstracted into a
formal specification model which is then confronted to the desired properties. Abstracting the source code
allows to get rid of irrelevant details about the semantics and to somehow simplify the verification step.
Depending on the properties to be proven and on the chosen source code language, the abstraction process
can be fully automated or require a more or less intensive developer intervention (for instance, via the an-
notation of some of the code constructs). The formal specification obtained from the code is then checked
against the desired properties producing results that need to be reinterpreted in terms of the original source
code.
Concrete Syntax Formal Semantics
Abstraction
Verif.
Properties
Source 
Code
model
Interpretation
Figure 2.14: Verification process.
Abstracting the model from the code is far from an easy task: the quality of the extraction process affects
the results of the verification. The extracted model must be at the same time precise and abstract enough.
Precise so that any proof obtained on the model level still holds on the source code and abstract so that ir-
relevant elements don’t pollute the formal reasoning process. Furthermore, a loss of precision is sometimes
necessary to make the semantics decidable. There is usually a trade-off to be made between the precision
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of the analysis and its decidability.
To illustrate the verification approach, a small example (adapted from [JSP11b]) demonstrating the usage
of the Verifast tool is presented in figure 2.15. It consist in a very naive Java implementation of a stack.
Verifast requires the source code to be annotated with preconditions and postconditions written in a specific
formalism. These properties to be verified as well as some interpretation-helper annotations have to be
manually specified by the developer. In this example, the size of the annotations almost overweights the
size of the original source code.
The main drawbacks of such annotation-driven techniques lie in the weight of these annotations : requiring
developers to annotate all the critical sections of the code with a tool-specific formalism causes the same set
of problems as those explained in the section about secure code generation techniques. It takes time to learn
and master such languages; and during that time, developer’s efforts are diverted from his main objective :
the production of the application’s code.
Furthermore, the results of those techniques are only as precise as the abstraction of the code is : the extra
load induced by the manually assisted abstraction usually limit their use to critical sections of the software.
This prevents the tools to verify the whole source code, possibly ignoring requirements violations in appar-
ently harmless code portions.
More details on verification techniques as well as numerous examples can be found in [Cou08], [CVC99]
and [Liv06].
2.3.2.2 Testing
Testing, on the other hand, derives a set of test-cases from the specification and checks whether the behavior
of the system on these specific cases matches the expected behavior or not (figure 2.16). It is a very intuitive
process, very close to the one used in physical goods manufacturing or empiric sciences.
The results of the tests heavily depend on the quality of the testing set: the considered test-cases must cover
as much as possible of the possible situations the system might encounter. As the set of potential test-cases
is often infinite, several approaches have been introduced to select the most representative candidates to
test. The reader interested in detailed explanations of the existing methods (both heuristic and formal) of
test-case selection can consult : [Pet], [JUn10] or [LTMPB08].
Testing has the defaults of its simplicity : proving that the system always satisfies its specification requires
exhaustive testing. This process is very time consuming and impossible if the potential test-case set is in-
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1 class Stack {
2 Node head;
3 //@ predicate valid(int count) = head |-> ?h &*& nodes(h, count);
4
5 Stack()
6 //@ requires true;
7 //@ ensures valid(0);
8 {
9 //@ close valid(0);
10 }
11
12 void push(int element)
13 //@ requires valid(?count);
14 //@ ensures valid(count + 1);
15 {
16 //@ open valid(count);
17 Node n = new Node();
18 n.value = element;
19 n.next = head;
20 head = n;
21 //@ close nodes(head, count + 1);
22 //@ close valid(count + 1);
23 }
24
25 int pop()
26 //@ requires valid(?count) &*& 0 < count;
27 //@ ensures valid(count - 1);
28 {
29 //@ open valid(count);
30 //@ open nodes(_, _);
31 int result = head.value;
32 head = head.next;
33 //@ close valid(count - 1);
34 return result;
35 }
36 }
Figure 2.15: Java Stack class, with Verifast annotations.
Exemple adapted from [JSP11b].
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Figure 2.16: The testing process.
finite, as it is often the case. On the other hand, testing is very useful to quickly detect property violation:
the test-case shows the violated property and the sequence of actions leading to that violation. This allows
the developer to easily pinpoint the faulty elements and correct them.
As such, testing is used in almost every software project, at least on a limited scale, to detect the most
obvious problems and to demonstrate the partial correction of the system to clients.
However, apart from a few very specific cases, testing a system in some selected cases is not sufficient to
prove it correct. Tests can quickly demonstrate that a system does not conform to its specification by the
production of a counter-example, but only formal verification or exhaustive testing can prove conformance.
2.4 Practical Software Engineering
As it is often the case real-world software engineering is a compromise between theory and practice. Even
though all the actors of the software development process (clients, analysts or developers) agree on the
importance of the respect of the specification, most of the software systems are deployed without being
thoroughly validated conformant to their specification.
The main reason behind this fact lies in the conflicting market constraints imposed on the software devel-
opment process : it should be as quick and as cheap as possible while producing secure and feature-rich
software. A compromise has then to be made, sacrificing some aspects in favor of others; for instance giving
up full system verification and/or testing to keep up with a previously announced release date. Even if this
means deploying an incomplete systems until the corrective patches are available. The choice between the
two approaches then becomes an political and economical one, where the costs and benefits of the different
options have to be taken into account, be they quantifiable ones, like the price of potential defects, or more
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fuzzy ones like customer satisfaction. An extended description of these potential factors can be found in
[Hol01]. A more complete description of the caveats of practical software engineering is available in [Pfl01]
and in [Mea].
2.4.1 UMLsec
UMLsec [Jü02] [Jur05] is an extension of the widely used unified modeling language (UML) [OMG09]
that allows one to define security properties and to formally check a model against those properties. The
set of UMLsec properties is not limited : anyone is welcome to define new properties to address new se-
curity concerns. UMLsec uses the standard UML extension mechanism, stereotypes and tagged values, to
describe security properties (figure 2.17).
Figure 2.17: UMLsec : Sequence diagram with the “permission” property. (reproduced from [Mon09])
The main idea behind UMLsec is to extend a model widely used by developers (the UML model) with
the constructs required to express precisely the security properties expected from the modeled elements.
These properties can then be used to automatically verify that the produced source code effectively exhibit
the expected behavior. Recent works [MJH+10] [Mon09] took the process one step further, producing the
security-related code directly from the model instead of only verifying it, bypassing the risk of developer
mis-implementation.
UMLsec, and the tools built on it, are an attempt to bring the best of the code production and code verifica-
tion worlds together. However, to express their full potential, they require the methodology to be adopted
from the early sketches of the software development process. The UMLsec methodology is hardly applica-
ble to existing software development projects conducted without any prior UML (or UML-like) specifica-
tion.
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Furthermore, the UMLsec methodology is often viewed as too rigid and too flexible at the same time. The
existing UMLsec extensions often do not exactly match the needs of the users. And, even though the open
extension mechanism built into UMLsec allows one to define almost any possible extension, these exten-
sions will not be understood and properly processed by existing tools. The developers are then left with
a choice between constructs only partially representing his needs and custom constructs forbidding him to
benefit from automated tools due to lack of support. Large teams may have the resources required to adapt
the existing tools to better fit their needs, but smaller teams certainly have not.
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This chapter introduces the motivating problem from which our research takes source. We present the scope
of this work and the set of problems frequently encountered by software developers we try to alleviate. The
running example that will be used in the following chapters to illustrate the models and the algorithms is
also detailled.
3.1 Motivating example
The root of our reflexion comes from the observation of the implementation of access-control in a com-
mercial software system. Developed and maintained by a small team, the application consisted in an online
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shared calendar augmented of some cooperative functionalities. It was suffering from an evolution-related
problem: its code kept being updated with new/adapted features while its specification stayed mostly static
and did not reflect all the changes operated.
The shared calendar application consisted of a set of programs designed to allow people to create, edit and
share their time schedules. Each user originally has full control over his own personal events and limited
access to any event shared with him, depending on the access-control properties specified by the object
owner. As such, the original permission model behind it was very close to DAC (see section 1.3.2.1, page
9 ). In addition to this discrete permission model, some general rules where hard-coded directly into the
application code to allow easy administration of the system as well as preventing data losses. For examples,
rules like “administrators always have access to any event” and “a user cannot give up his rights on an
object if he is the last one able to access it” were hard-coded to allow easy administration and to prevent
events from being definitively unreachable.
Development was carried with a prototype-like approach : each revision of the system implemented a grow-
ing set of features in order to cover as many as possible of the requirements expressed by the different users.
Prototyping allowed developers to obtain a quick feed-back on the functionalities of the system, allowing
for a rapid evolution of the feature set.
From an access-control perspective, things became to get out of control when the application continued to
evolve. New feature insertion, emerging customer queries or team modifications caused unwanted side-
effects :
• more and more rules where hard-coded, some of them overlapping / shadowing previous ones, thus
modifying the behavior of the system in a way not always easy to find (figure 3.1).
• user-managed groups were added to the system, quickly introducing the question of conflicts in ex-
isting permissions as well as the need for more global, hardcoded, rules dedicated to the management
of these groups (for instance rules designed to prevent the deletion of the last user in a group still
containing events).
• new developers joined the project, others changed affectation, taking away their full understanding
of the rules they wrote.
As a result, more and more unexpected and incoherent behaviors were reported by the users and each “bug”
correction made the access-control code a little bit more complex. Soon the developers began to realize that
none of them still mastered the whole access-control aspect of their system: event though they understood
the effect of each rule separately, the cumulative effect of the whole rule set was more than obscure to them.
Any new modification was introducing unwanted side-effects, which in turn required new modifications,
initiating an almost infinite loop of patches close to the never-ending development problem presented in
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Figure 3.1: Rule insertion : uncertain side-effects
Inserting a new rule (here on P1) may cause side-effects on previously added
rules that are not trivial to detect
chapter 2 (page 27).
To solve this problem, a complete rewrite of the access-control code seemed the proper solution, but it
quickly turned out that without anyone able to understand what was exactly doing the current code, writing
a new one would inevitably impact current users in the way they were used to the system. More than that,
this would only be a temporary measure, as the new code would also be subject to the same evolution-
related problem as the old one, resulting in the emergence of the same problems in the near future.
After a quick search, two possible solutions were identified: either should the rewritten access-control code
be frozen in its initial state, preventing any modification thus preserving its integrity but preventing some
possible clients to use their software because some of their requirement might not be met. Or should they
find a way to know exactly what is the impact of every modification in their code, in order to detect potential
conflicts between rules before they adversely affect the behavior of the system.
However the company didn’t have the resources required for such a formal modeling of their requirements
and code : time and costs involved in this formal stage would cause the whole project to get out of schedule
and budget. It would also require the developers team to be trained to formal modeling and verification,
moving them away from their primary objective - producing and maintaining code - to an unproductive
state: learning formal methods. This would cause a unacceptable hiatus in system releases possibly leading
customers to try other vendor’s solutions to match up with their new specific requirements. Furthermore,
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such training is an investment for better and more secure software in the future, but it is an investment
almost impossible to pay for small structures.
3.2 Analysis
The source of their problems lied in the gap between what a software development process should be and
what it usually is: the development of a software system usually takes places in several consecutive steps
(figure 3.2) : the developer and the users settle on a set of requirements for the upcoming application, the
developers translate this set of requirements into a more or less formal specification aimed at resolving
any existing ambiguities, then implements it. If the developer doesn’t make any implementation errors,
any properties verified by the specification still holds in the final application, providing the desired security
properties to the users’ system.
User
REQ
?!?
User
Ok !
User
Application
DEV
Figure 3.2: Straight development.
Close to the waterfall model presented page 27, the ideal software
development process is a forward-going process where choices never need to
be reconsidered. In absence of programming bugs, all properties specified
during the requirements stage still hold in the final application.
However, this canonical scheme is far from reflecting the reality of most software development projects.
During the development of the software system, the client can change his mind on some features. For
example modifying the specified behavior of some element or adding/removing some feature. External
constraints may cause developers not to reflect those changes on the specification, or reflect them but not
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check again that this new specification still meets the original requirements. The modifications are then im-
plemented into the code by the developers and delivered to the customer as a prototype to be tested (figure
3.3). The question then arises : “does the delivered application still meet the original specification?” .
Most of the time, the answer is false, or at best unknown, as the original specification does not contain all
the updates introduced along the development cycle. So the delivered application cannot be guaranteed to
exhibit the behaviors specified on the early stages of development. This is problematic as these behaviors
specified in the early stage of development are the basic features sought by the client on his application, and
the ones he’s willing to pay for.
User
User
Application
User
DEV
?!?
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Prototype Prototype Prototype
??
Figure 3.3: Prototype development.
The relation between the final application and the original model is broken
because of the code-changes introduced by new user requirements are not fully
properly reflected on the specification.
We propose a methodology to help the developer to update the specification of the application at each step
of the development cycle. Attempting to guarantee that any updates made to the code (or to the specifica-
tion) is propagated to the specification (resp. the code) (figure 3.4). During this co-evolution process, we
try to be as un-intrusive as possible : the developer should not be burdened with constant formal model
specification or verification and cryptic messages, leaving him as focused as possible on his main task :
producing code implementing the given requirements.
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Figure 3.4: Assisted prototype development.
The relation between the final application and the original model is
maintained through assisted propagation of the modifications.
3.2.1 Objectives
Our methodology should be simple enough to be used in limited development environments: many soft-
ware company do not have enough resources (both financially and in terms of people) to maintain a team
dedicated to the verification of their software systems, be it through testing or using more formal methods.
In small teams, analysts, developers, testers and validators usually share the same seats; taking on one role
or another depending on the planning of the day.
More precisely: we aim at small teams (usually a few people) composed of developers having a good knowl-
edge of the chosen development language and little to no knowledge of formal verification techniques. This
absence of knowledge of formal techniques is often caused by a lack of time / money dedicated to “un-
productive” formation. Formal methods do not make developers code faster, they can only assist them to
produce better code.
We try to help the developer to make the code as secure as possible without changing their habits beyond
tolerance. Most developers are willing to be helped by tools in their development practice if (and only
if) it does not force them to completely change the way they work. Small adaptations/improvements can
be tolerated, but not complete revolutions (at least not in one step). Producing more secure code is a step
further on the long path to completely secure applications.
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The need for an helper methodology and tool is present as long as it does not have a deep impact on every-
day work. Ideally, developers should be able to submit their source code directly into the helper tool, along
with their requirements, and receive an human-readable report of inconsistencies eventually found, accom-
panied with proposed corrective measures (figure 3.5). Used formalism should be easily understandable by
someone with a good programming background but little to no formal method knowledge. The same re-
quirement of simplicity holds for the display and propagation of results (in terms of proposed modification
in the code and/or in the requirements); they should be presented in a way allowing the developers to keep
complete control over his own code. At the end of the day, the developer still is the one responsible for the
correction of his code, so must he at all times be able to understand and validate any change proposed, for
instance in order to explain them to his management.
Verification
Source 
Code
Requirements
Report 
+ 
Solutions
Feedback
Figure 3.5: Blackbox verification.
Depending on the hypothesis that can be made on the source code, the precision of the results (both in terms
of proved requirements and proposed modifications) may be affected. Our methodology will attempt to pro-
vide a best-effort approach, producing results as precise as possible without requiring too deep changes in
developers habits.
3.3 Running example
Every time possible in the next chapters, a single example will be used to illustrate the methodology and
the different algorithms used. It is built from a huge simplification of the case study presented above. We
will consider a very simplified calendar system containing events, private events and group events. In the
following, the notion of “owner” of an object will refer to the user (or group) to which it belongs. The
original owner of an object is the user who initiated it’s creation, while the current owner is the user to
which the object was given by the previous owner.
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• an event represents the usual notion of event in a calendar. It can be created by users and accessed by
those allowed to do so by the event owner.
• a private event is an event only accessible by his owner.
• a group event is an event belonging to a group of users instead of a single user. It is managed by the
group owner and it can be accessed by all the members of the group he belongs to.
Sample access-control properties desired to be applied on such a system by the clients could be :
• an administrator should always be able to access any event, regardless of its type. (?)
• the owner of an event should be able to share it with some selected others.
• the owner of an event should be able to stop sharing it with others.
• private events should only be accessible by their owner. (?)
• group events should be readable by all group members.
Some of the rules expressed here clearly conflict : for instance, the two rules marked with a star (?) are
incompatible. Implementing one of the two would inevitably break the other. If detected during the devel-
opment stage, this incompatibility must be sorted out by refining the requirements. If not, only thorough
testing and/or verification can prevent the system to exhibit potentially erroneous behaviors if one of their
conflicting scenario ever happen.
From a development point of view, implementing this system in an object-oriented language like Java could
end up in a class hierarchy like the one illustrated in figure 3.6. The access-control is managed through
dedicated methods named isAuthorized(requestor, op). These methods return true if the subject identi-
fied as requestor is allowed to perform operation op on the current object, false otherwise. Each object is
required to implement this method and to call it before executing any operation on itself.
Oversimplified code snippets of the access-control part of the different objects are presented in figures 3.7
to 3.10 :
• the class CObject (figure 3.7) represents the common elements of all the objects used in the calendar
system. It contains functional methods dedicated to object manipulation like cloning, deletion, cre-
ation, ... Its access-control part is quite simple, consisting of only two rules : one explicitly allowing
administrators to perform any action on the object, and the other forbidding specific users from ac-
cessing it. The isForbidden(requestor, op) element appearing inside the code refers to an explicit
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CObject
bool isAuthorized(..)
(...)
CEvent
bool isAuthorized(..)
(...)
CPrivateEvent
bool isAuthorized(..)
(...)
CGroupEvent
bool isAuthorized(..)
(...)
Figure 3.6: Running example object Hierarchy.
prohibition list given inside the source code. It’s role is to deny the specified requestor to execute
the operation op on the current object 1.
• the class CEvent (figure 3.8) represents a calendar event. It stores all the information associated
with this event (for instance its name, date, note, ...) and provides methods to access and update this
information. From an access-control point of view, an event is accessible under the same conditions
as a CObject plus in the case where the requestor is the owner of the object or if the requestor has
been explicitly authorized to access it by the owner.
• the classCPrivateEvent (figure 3.9) represents a private event, i.e. an event that can only be viewed
and edited by his owner. It cannot be shared among users.
• the class CGroupEvent (figure 3.10) represents an event owner by a group, not by a single user like
in the CEvent class. As such, the access-control section contains group-specific rules in addition to
the rules inherited from the CEvent class. These specific rules allow the group owner to access any
object owned by the group as well as any group member to have read access to the group’s objects.
1From a general point of view, nothing forces the prohibitions defined by the isForbidden(· · · ) to be disjunct from the positive
permissions granted by the isAuthorized(· · · ), meaning that the order of appearance of the instructions influences the results of the
method.
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1 public class CObject {
2 (...)
3 public boolean isAuthorized(CSubject requestor, COperation op ) {
4
5 if (requestor.isAdministrator()) {return true;}
6 if (isForbidden(requestor, op)) {return false;}
7
8 return false;
9 }
10 (...)
11 }
Figure 3.7: CObject access-control code
1 public class CEvent extends CObject {
2 (...)
3 public boolean isAuthorized(CSubject requestor, COperation op ) {
4 if (super.isAuthorized(requestor, op)) return true;
5 else return requestor.equals(this.owner)
6 || isAllowed(requestor, op);
7 }
8 (...)
9 }
Figure 3.8: CEvent access-control code
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1 public class CPrivateEvent extends CEvent {
2 (...)
3 public boolean isAuthorized(CSubject requestor, COperation op ) {
4 return requestor.equals(this.owner);
5 }
6 (...)
7 }
Figure 3.9: CPrivateEvent access-control code
1 public class CGroupEvent extends CEvent {
2 (...)
3 public boolean isAuthorized(CSubject requestor, COperation op ) {
4 if (super.isAuthorized(requestor, op)) return true;
5
6 if (owner.isGroup())
7 if (requestor.equals(owner.getOwner())) return true;
8 else if (owner.isMember(requestor) && op == COperation.READ)
9 return true;
10
11 return false;
12 }
13 (...)
14 }
Figure 3.10: CGroupEvent access-control code
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In this chapter, we present the models and algorithms designed to help developers to detect potential mis-
matches between the specification and the implementation of a software system. When applicable, cor-
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rective measures can be offered to the developers. For simplicity, we focus only on the access-control
perspective.
4.1 Overview
The main idea behind our approach is to provide methods and algorithms to help the developer make his
executable source code and the underlying access-control model co-evolve. We provide him a way to prop-
agate modifications made on one of them to the other.
The proposed approach (figure 4.1) consists in the extraction and formalization of the access-control ele-
ments implemented into the code and their verification against the desired properties specified by the devel-
oper. If inconsistencies are found, an execution trace leading to the error as well as potentially corrective
measures are proposed :
• either by updating the requirements to reflect the desired behavior.
• either by updating the access-control model and propagating the updates directly into the executable
code.
• or both.
The automation of the extraction and weaving of the access-control model into the code allows the devel-
oper to focus only on the requirements and on his code, hiding away all the formal “details”.
Weaver
Access Control Model
Security Aspect Extractor
Miner
Requirements Analyzer Results/Answers
Code
++ Source
Figure 4.1: Overview.
The following sections and chapters detail each of the steps involved with the model extraction / weaving
and the verification of the results. The remaining of this chapter focuses on the extraction of the access-
control model from the source code, the specification of the requirements, the specification of the environ-
ment. The verification of the conformance of the extracted model to the requirements and the generation
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of the proposed corrective measures will be presented in the next chapter. Chapter 6 then addresses the
weaving of the (possibly modified) access-control model back into the code and introduces some possible
optimizations.
4.2 AC Model extraction
The first step toward proving the correctness of the produced implementation with respect to the specified
requirements is to parse the source code and extract the implemented access-control model (figure 4.2).
This step is obviously very dependent on the source code language chosen by the considered developers,
their coding habits and followed conventions as well as on the structures found into it.
Access Control Model
Security Aspect Extractor
Miner
Code
++ Source
Figure 4.2: AC Model extraction.
This kind of exact static extraction is known to be computationally hard (see [Ric53] and the halting prob-
lem for more details) and is practically impossible to do in most modern language like Java or C without
taking into account simplification hypothesis on the code to be analyzed.
4.2.1 Taking advantage of coding conventions
To alleviate the computational cost and complexity of the extraction as well as to sharpen the extraction
result, the extraction algorithm uses the coding conventions followed by the developers. For ease of devel-
opment and maintenance, developers usually produce code following some standards, be they explicit or
implicit. For instance, they may follow variable naming schemes, standard code structures, use standard-
ized API, ... The exact set of conventions used in the considered application is usually company-specific :
each company uses the set most suitable to their needs and to the capacities of their developers.
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The code snippet presented in figure 4.3, adapted from our case study, exhibits some of the possible con-
ventions that may be encountered :
• regroup all the implemented access-control rules in a/some specific location(s) in the source code.
This can be a be a dedicated function (as illustrated in the figure 4.3) or more distributed behaviors,
like Dijkstra guarded commands (see [Dij76] for details on Dijkstra guarded commands).
• structure the code following a common framework. Here, the access-control rules are implemented
under the form of simple “conditions implies decision” rules.
• voluntarily limit the source-language features used in the expression of those rules, in order to provide
easy and quick readability as well as to avoid potential understanding problems between various team
members.
• ...
This kind of coding conventions are not restricted to the object-oriented languages; similar or equivalent
conventions can be found in almost all coding paradigms. In fact, many best-practices and coding standards
encourage developers to apply such conventions to more readable and manageable code. See for instance
[Fou11] , [EM09] or [US 88].
4.2.2 AC Model
The extracted access-control model will be expressed in a simple “condition ⇒ action” form using the
simple syntax shown in figure 4.4. Inspired from logic languages, this language is designed to support
monolithic access-control models as well as those structures through inheritance.
The model basically consists of a list of classModel items. Each of these classModel is identified by
a name and contains a non-empty list of rules. A rule is formed of a precondition, expressed as a logical
combination of predicates, and an action, here a permission (possibly a negative one, a prohibition) for a
subject S to perform operation Op on object Ob. The set of rules applicable to an access-control class C is
then formed by the combination of the rules of every classes it inherits from (H1, H2, . . . , Hn) and all the
rules specified in its body.
Any operation can be considered here, be the classic ones like read, write and execute or more advanced
ones like grant read, grant write, grant execute, revoke read, revoke write, revoke execute, destroy and give.
The only exception concerns the permission to create objects: this model is centered on per-object permis-
sion and, as, such, specifying the permission to create an object on a not yet created object would be odd.
The constraints weighting on object creation will be specified later on in section 4.5.
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1 public abstract class CustomObject {
2 (...)
3 public boolean isAuthorized(Person requestor, short nOps) {
4 if (requestor.isAdministrator()) {return true;}
5
6 if (isForbidden(requestor, nOps)) {return false;}
7
8 PersonOrGroup owner = getOwner();
9 if (requestor.equals(owner)) {return true;}
10
11 if (owner.equals(Somebody.getInstance())) {return true;}
12
13 if (owner.isGroup()) {
14 if (requestor.equals(owner.getOwner())) {return true;}
15 else if (((Group) owner).isMember(requestor)) {
16 if (nOps == OperationType.READ) {return true;}
17 }
18 } (...)
19 }
20 return false;
21 } (...)
22 }
Figure 4.3: AC Model extraction, sample source code.
In this sample Java class file, developers have grouped all the access-control
elements in a specific method. Its content is structured in simple “condition
=> action” elements to maintain readability.
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model :: classModel *
classModel :: class C [ extends H1, H2, . . . , Hn ] rule +
rule :: pre : [ not ] allowed(S,Op,Ob)
pre :: predicate(· · · ) | pre ∧ pre | pre ∨ pre | ¬ pre | ( pre )
Figure 4.4: AC model syntax
4.2.2.1 Expressivity
The syntax of this access-control rule specification language is voluntarily kept as simple as possible to
allow developers to understand it without too much effort. It is however expressive enough to cover most
of the access-control primitives found in standards like XACML v2 [OAS05].
In the same way, both DAC and MAC permission models can be expressed in this proposed language (fig-
ure 4.5). A DAC system can be modelled through the creation of a class element for each system object,
assigning the proper permission on the considered object to each couple user, operation. On the other hand,
a MAC permission system can be modelled using a single permission class, deciding which access to grant
(or to forbid) based solely on the clearance level of the considered user and object.
1 class DAC_Object_X
2 : allowed(John, read, x)
3 : allowed(Mary, write, x)
4 : not allowed(S, Op, x)
1 class MAC
2 S.level >= Ob.level : allowed(S, read, Ob)
3 S.level <= Ob.level : allowed(S, write, Ob)
4 : not allowed(S,Op,Ob)
Figure 4.5: Expressing DAC and MAC properties.
4.2.2.2 Semantics
The semantics of this simple access-control model language is almost straightforward. The expressed mod-
els are mapped to ordered sets of rules with respect to the following equations.
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A rule represents a permission under a simple implication form :
Jpre* : allowed(S,Op,Ob) K = Jpre*K→ can(S,Op,Ob) (4.1)
Jpre* : not allowed(S,Op,Ob) K = Jpre*K→ cannot(S,Op,Ob) (4.2)
Where the can(· · · , · · · , · · · ) predicate (resp. cannot(· · · , · · · , · · · )) refers to the presence in the under-
lying access-control matrix of the corresponding positive (resp. negative) permission. The semantics of theJpre* K element is derived directly from the semantics of first-order logic.
Note : The order in which the rules appear in the model is important, so semantics of rules will be encom-
passed with a order number, allowing to manage the couples ( rule id , rule ) as set elements without losing
ordering information. For readability reasons and to limit the size of the definitions, the rule element will
sometimes be given in extended form c → perm(S,Op,Ob) where c and and perm(S,Op,Ob) denote,
respectively, the condition and the permission associated with the considered rule element.
Definition 1. The rules (a, ca → perma(Sa, Opa, Oba)) and (b, cb → permb(Sb, Opb, Obb)) overlap if
∃σ :

σSa = σSb
∧ σOpa = σOpb
∧ σOba = σObb
 ∧ (σca ∩ σcb) 6= ∅
with {perma, permb} ⊂ {can, cannot}.
Two rules overlap if they can apply to the same set of permissions and their preconditions overlap; i.e. if
there exists a substitution σ such that the permissions granted by the two considered rules apply on the same
object and the rules preconditions overlap.
Definition 2. The rules (a, ca → perma(Sa, Opa, Oba)) and (b, cb → permb(Sb, Opb, Obb)) are inde-
pendent if they do not overlap.
Two independent rules never apply on the same permission or have disjunct preconditions.
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Definition 3. The rules (a, ca → perma(Sa, Opa, Oba)) and (b, cb → permb(Sb, Opb, Obb)) conflict if
they overlap and provide opposite permissions.
⇐⇒ ∃σ :

σSa = σSb
∧ σOpa = σOpb
∧ σOba = σObb
 ∧ (σca ∩ σcb) 6= ∅
with perma = can (resp. cannot) and permb = cannot (resp. can).
The simple ruleset shown in figure 4.6 illustrates these properties. Rules 1 and 2 overlap, because both of
them can grant permissions to user jean to read object system. Rules 1 and 3 are independent : whatever
the substitution, they will never apply on the same permission. Finally, rules 2 and 4 conflicts : there are
situations where they overlap and provide opposite permissions to user jean on object system.
1 (1, p(X) -> can(X, read, Z))
2 (2, true -> can(jean, Op, system))
3 (3, q(X) -> can(X, write, board))
4 (4, p(X) -> cannot(X, Op, system))
Figure 4.6: Sample ruleset.
Numerals and lower-case elements are constants, upper-case elements are
variables.
In order to capture the full semantics of the set of rules contained in a classModel element, resolv-
ing potential overlapping and/or shadowing between rules, we define a specialized union operator
M⋃
:
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Definition 4. The rule combination operator
M⋃
computes the combination of two rules, removing any
existing overlapping between them.
(i, ri)
M⋃
(j, rj) = {(1, ri), (2, u)}
where :
• ri = p : perm(S,Ob,Op)
• fresh(rj , ri) = q : perm′(S′, Op′, Ob′)
• u = ¬(p ∧ S = S′ ∧Op = Op′ ∧Ob = Ob′) ∧ q : perm′(S′, Op′, Ob′)
With fresh(a, b) providing a fresh renaming of all free variables occurring in a and previously appearing
in b.
Applying the
M⋃
operator on the two first rules of the ruleset presented in figure 4.6 gives :{
(1, p(X)− > can(X, read, Z))
(2, not(p(X)&X = jean&Op = read&Z = system)&true− > can(X,Op, system))
}
where the second element can be simplified to obtain the more readable permission set{
(1, p(X)− > can(X, read, Z))
(2, not(p(jean)&Op = read)− > can(jean,Op, system))
}
stating that anyone satisfying the precondition p(X) can read any object and that user jean can execute
any operation on object system if satisfying the given condition. The precondition appearing in the second
rule only states that this particular rule should not grant the permission to user jean to read object system
when satisfying p because this permission is already managed by the first rule.
In case of overlapping / conflict between the two rules, as it is the case in the example above, the
M⋃
operator
gives priority to the left-hand rule (figure 4.7). A direct consequence of this definition is the behavior with
respect to the empty set :
∅
M⋃
(i, r) = {(1, r)} = (i, r)
M⋃
∅ (4.3)
This adapted union operator is then easily extended to combine set of rules :
{(i, ri)}i=1,··· ,n
M⋃
{(j, sj)}j=1,··· ,m = (1, r1)
M⋃
(2, r2)
M⋃
· · ·
M⋃
(n, rn)
M⋃
(1, s1)
M⋃
(2, s2)
M⋃
· · ·
M⋃
(m, sm)
(4.4)
With the "shortcut" notations :
M⋃
a≤i≤b (i, ri) =
{
(1, ra)
M⋃ (M⋃
a+1≤l≤b(l, rl)
)}
(4.5)
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A : 
B : 
A U B : 
M
Figure 4.7:
MS
operator.
In case of conflicting rules, the rule combination operator gives priority to the
left-hand member.
From there, the semantics of a classModel element can be obtained by the combination of all the relevant
rules, both inherited and explicit :
J class C [ extends H1, H2, . . . , Hn ] rule +K =
C,(M⋃ 1≤j≤nJHjK) M⋃
 M⋃
1≤i≤| rule +|
(i, {J rule [i]K})

(4.6)
Decomposing equation 4.6 in more manageable parts, the semantics of the classModel element is given
by the combination of all the rules inherited into the class (left-hand part of the head rule combination op-
erator) and class-specified rules (right-hand part).
Finally, the semantics of the model element is simply given by the set of the semantics of the classModels
it contains :
J classModel ∗K = ⋃
i=1,··· ,n
{JclassModeliK} (4.7)
4.2.3 Extraction Process
The above-presented access-control model imposes constraints on the extraction process. Representing the
access-control rules as a sequence of logical implications and replicating some of them through several
rules requires that the basic blocks of these implications behave as state-less predicates and functions.
Definition 5. A state-less predicate is a predicate p(a1, · · · , an) whose truth value depends solely on the
values of its arguments and does not modify the execution environment.
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Definition 6. A state-less function is a function f(a1, · · · , an) whose return value depends solely on the
values of its arguments and does not modify the execution environment.
Manipulating state-less functions and predicates allows the adapted union operator
M⋃
to replicate calls into
the rules during its disambiguation process without modifying the semantics of the rule set.
The choice of state-less functions and predicates has an impact on the code constructs that can be accepted:
it prohibits the use of random and/or environment-driven functions inside the access-control methods. For
instance, methods asking the user to allow or forbid an access through a dialog box or allowing the five first
access queries cannot be represented in this model.
The access-control model extraction process is driven by the chosen implementation language and devel-
oper’s coding conventions. The remaining of this section will present the extraction techniques adapted
from our case study and illustrate their behavior on the running example from section 3.3.
4.2.3.1 Specific hypothesis
Apart from the constraints presented above, building an automated AC-extraction algorithm requires iden-
tifying precisely what coding conventions can be used to ease the process. These are obviously specific to
the considered project, but the same kind of strategy can apply in most of the applications.
Considering the running example introduced in section 3.3 (page 51), the access-control related elements
of the code are clearly identifiable. They are contained in isAuthorized(requestor, op) methods and their
inner structure is mainly based on conditional statements. A call to this method is used to determine if the
specified requestor is allowed or not to perform operation op on the current instance of the object. An
execution branch ending with a return(true) instruction permit the queried access while branches ending
with return(false) refuse it. The access-control methods of the different object classes from the example
are linked together through the utilisation of the super.isAuthorized(· · · ), referring to the access-control
properties of the supertype of the currently considered object instance (following Java class-hierarchy).
In order to comply with the state-less requirement applying to functions and predicates manipulated by
the adapted union operator and to keep the extraction algorithm as readable as possible, all function calls
encountered into the access-control methods will be considered state-less. There is no easy way to check
this rather strong hypothesis but to rely on developer’s understanding of his code.
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4.2.3.2 Extraction Algorithm
The algorithms in this section will be presented in a pseudo-code format. Some details will be moved from
the algorithm’s code to the accompanying descriptions for clarity purposes.
The basic idea is to process each source class and parse the corresponding access-control method. Then,
for each execution path ending with a return(· · · ) statement, produce the access-control rules representing
the semantics of the execution paths leading to that return(· · · ) statement.
Algorithm 1 SECURITY ASPECT EXTRACTION
1: for all class C do
2: m← AC_Method_Name
3: for each return statement R in m do
4: P ← paths(m,R)
5: for each p ∈ P do
6: for all (Q,Action) ∈ outcomes(R, p,requestor, Op, Ob) do
7: Model←+ (class(C,Ob) ∧Q→ Action)
8: end for
9: end for
10: end for
11: end for
Algorithm 1 details this process :
[l. 1-2] for each class C in the considered source code, the AC-method is extracted
(m)1
[l. 3] then for each return(· · · ) statement R found in m:
[l. 4] all the execution paths insidem leading toR are collected intoP (see algorithm
3 for details on this process) .
[l. 5-7] an access-control rule is added to the model for every potential outcome of each
of the considered execution path (see algorithm 2 for details on these potential
outcomes generation)
The Ob appearing in the rules refers to the current instance of the object of class C, i.e. the object on which
the access is requested.
The outcomes(R,P, requestor,Op,Ob) algorithm (algorithm 2) converts the selected return statement
(R) into a guarded permission, making the implicit elements inherited from the access-control function
prototype explicit. It returns a set of couples containing a sequence of instruction and their associated per-
mission.
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Algorithm 2 OUTCOMES(· · · )
1: if (R == return(true)) then
2: returns( { (P, allowed(requestor, Op, Ob) } )
3: else
4: if (R == return(false)) then
5: returns( { (P, not allowed(requestor, Op, Ob) } )
6: else
7: { R == return(X) }
8: return ( { (P ∧ X , allowed(requestor, Op, Ob)) , ((P ∧ ¬ X , not allowed(requestor, Op, Ob)) } )
9: end if
10: end if
The paths(m,R) algorithm (algorithm 3) returns all execution paths inm leading toR. It works by reverse
induction over the structure of the abstract syntax tree representing the considered method source code (fig-
ure 4.8).
1
2 3
4
7 8
5 6
9 10 11
Figure 4.8: paths(· · · ) : reverse induction over abstract syntax tree.
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Algorithm 3 PATHS(M, R)
1: S←− R
2: A←− ∅
3: while (m 6= S) do
4: (· · · ) {rev-induction(S,A)}
5: S← S.father();
6: end while
7: return A
With the reverse induction on structure (rev-induction(S,A)) mapping a syntactic structure from the abstract
syntax tree to a set of sequences of instructions according to the rules presented in equations 4.8 to 4.11:
return(X) −→ { [return(X)] } (4.8)
A return instruction basically marks the end of the instruction sequence leading to itself. As such, it is
represented by the sequence of instructions containing only itself.
if (E) then S1 else S2 −→
{{
[ (E == v) | A] if A ⊆ (S1
⋃
S2)
[ (E==true) ; S1 | A] , [ (E==false); S2 | A] otherwise
}
(4.9)
A conditional instruction can be encountered in two distinct contexts : the execution path can either come
out of one of the two branches of the alternatives or it can come across the whole instruction. The two parts
of the equation 4.9 adress these two possibilities.
• The upper part of the equation manages the case where the execution path is coming out of the “then”
or of the “else” branch of the conditional. The resulting execution path is composed of the instructions
declared in the condition expression (E) and the expected truth value (v) followed by the instructions
contained in the alternative we are coming from. The expected truth value (v) is based on the branch
containing the considered return(· · · ) statement : v = true for S1 and v = false for S2. The
accumulator A contains the sequence of instructions required to go from the return statement at the
leaf of the syntax tree up to the conditional we are considering.
• The lower part adresses the case where the whole conditional instruction has to be included in the
execution path. It then produces two (possibly sets of) execution paths : one considering the execution
of the “then” part of the alterative, the other considering the “else” one. As a simplification, if any
of the sequences generated from these branches contains a return(· · · ) statement which is always
executed, they can be omitted.
The notation [ A | B] denotes the set of sequences formed by the element A followed by every sequence
in B.
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x=y −→ { [z=y | (A { x / z } )] } (4.10)
An affectation instruction consists in the evaluation of the affectation and the propagation of the modified
value in the remainder of the sequence. The z variable appearing in equation 4.10 is a fresh variable con-
taining the effects of the affectation. The notation A { x / z } represents the substitution, in A, of all the free
occurrences of x by z.
f(a1, · · · , an) −→ { [f(a1, · · · , an) | A] } (4.11)
Much like the return(· · · ) statement, a function call simply inserts itself in the sequence of instructions.
Some instructions have been voluntarily excluded from this induction process : the loop instructions (while
and for for the Java language). Finite loops can be unrolled as sequences of instructions (see figure 4.9 for
an example of such loop unrolling) while allowing potentially infinite ones would make the code parsing
and the attached semantics much more complex without adding much to the expressivity of the access-
control code.
1 i = 0;
2 while (i < 5) do
3 foo(i);
4 i = i+1;
5 done;
1 foo(0);
2 foo(1);
3 foo(2);
4 foo(3);
5 foo(4);
6
Figure 4.9: Unrolling finite loops.
Some loops can be unrolled and converted to a sequence of instruction while
preserving their semantics.
4.2.3.3 Example
As an illustration of the behavior of these algorithms, they will be applied to the running example intro-
duced in section 3.3 (page 51).
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The dedicated access-control method found in the CObject class source code (presented in figure 3.7) can
be represented as the abstract syntax tree show in figure 4.10. Graphically speaking, the extraction process
will :
1. identify all the return statements present into the code (marked with a ? in figure 4.10)
2. build the sequence of instructions running from the beginning of the access-control method to the
considered return(· · · ) statement. The three paths identified here are labelled P1, P2 and P3.
3. create the access-control rules representing each of these paths.
The resulting access-control model can be found in figure 4.11. In this example, the rule for path P2 (lines 6
and 7) was simplified by removing the dead branches created by the presence of the return(· · · ) statement
in the first conditional instruction. The typing element class(CObject, Ob) found on every line allows
to trace any rule back to it’s originating source code class, even after the access-control rules have been
disambiguated.
As an illustration, the extracted ruleset from the CObject class (figure 4.11) produces the following inde-
pendent rules after the merging process :
S.isAdministrator() == true −→ allowed(S,Op,Ob)
S.isAdministrator() == false ∧ isForbidden(S,Op) == true −→ not allowed(S,Op,Ob)
S.isAdministrator() == false ∧ isForbidden(S,Op) == false −→ not allowed(S,Op,Ob)

For readability purposes, the class(· · · ) elements were omitted from the above formulas and some variables
have been renamed.
The models obtained at this stage reflect the semantics of the access-control decisions taken into the con-
sidered source code, they both share the same strengths and weaknesses. For instance, the model obtained
from the CEvent class does not cover all of the possible execution paths2. This lack of a default case is
a hint for a mis-expressed security property and should be reported back to the developer if this missing
default case appears to be reachable the end of the verification process.
The same process leads to the production of the access-control models for the CEvent (figure 4.12) ,
CPrivateEvent (figure 4.13) and CGroupEvent (figure 4.14) classes.
2This code takes no decision in the case where the requestor element satisfies not requestor.equals(owner) and not isAl-
lowed(requestor, op) .
CHAPTER 4. MODEL EXTRACTION 73
isAuthorized(..)
IF
IF
return false
return true
req.isAdmin()
isForbidden(..)
return false
P1
P2
P3
then
then
ne
xt
ne
xt
Figure 4.10: Abstract syntax tree for the CObject class.
1 class CObject
2
3 (class(CObject, Ob) & requestor.isAdministrator() == true)
4 : allowed(requestor, Op, Ob)
5
6 (class(CObject, Ob) & isForbidden(requestor, op) == true)
7 : not allowed(requestor, Op, Ob)
8
9 (class(CObject, Ob) : not allowed(requestor, Op, Ob)
Figure 4.11: Access-control model extracted from the CObject class source code.
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1 class CEvent
2
3 (class(CEvent, Ob) & super.isAuthorized(requestor, op) == true)
4 : allowed(requestor, Op, Ob)
5
6 (class(CEvent, Ob) & super.isAuthorized(requestor, op) == false
7 & requestor.equals(this.owner))
8 : allowed(requestor, Op, Ob)
9
10 (class(CEvent, Ob) & super.isAuthorized(requestor, op) == false
11 & isAllowed(requestor, op))
12 : allowed(requestor, Op, Ob)
Figure 4.12: Access-control model extracted from the CEvent class source code.
1 class CPrivateEvent
2
3 (class(CPrivateEvent, Ob) & requestor.equals(this.owner) == true)
4 : allowed(requestor, Op, Ob)
5
6
7 (class(CPrivateEvent, Ob) & requestor.equals(this.owner) == false)
8 : not allowed(requestor, Op, Ob)
9
Figure 4.13: Access-control model extracted from the CPrivateEvent class source code.
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1 class CGroupEvent
2
3 (class(CGroupEvent, Ob) & super.isAuthorized(requestor, op) == true)
4 : allowed(requestor, Op, Ob)
5
6 (class(CGroupEvent, Ob) & owner.isGroup()
7 & requestor.equals(owner.getOwner()) == true)
8 : allowed(requestor, Op, Ob)
9
10 (class(CGroupEvent, Ob) & owner.isGroup()
11 & requestor.equals(owner.getOwner()) == false
12 & owner.isMember(requestor) == true
13 & op == COperation.READ)
14 : allowed(requestor, Op, Ob)
15
16 (class(CGroupEvent, Ob) : not allowed(requestor, Op, Ob)
Figure 4.14: Access-control model extracted from the CGroupEvent class source code.
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4.3 Requirements specification
Aside from the production of the source code, the second major developer’s intervention in our proposed
methodology lies in the specification of the requirements. No verification is possible without a good de-
scription of the properties expected from the implementation. The perso most suited to produce such a
requirement specification being the developer, we attempt to provide him a simple yet expressive language
for this task.
The simple requirements expression language detailled in this section was developed to allow the developer
to define precisely what properties are to be expected from the implemented source code. It aims both
at readability and expressivity and is adressed at a public a priori not introduced in formal languages and
methods.
4.3.1 Language
The requirement specification language tries to conjugate simplicity and expressivity. Its main goal is to
allow developers to express the access-control properties the system should meet. It tries to stay as natural
as possible while providing enough expressivity to describe real-world situations in access-control.
In terms of expressivity, the chosen language has to be able to represent the two most frequent access-control
requirements:
• The static query : is “X” able/forbidden to do operation “Y ” on object “Z" ? (said otherwise : is
(X,Y, Z) an active permission/prohibition)
• And the dynamic one : is there a way “X” can be become able/prohibited to perform operation
”Y ” on object “Z" ? This question can be refined to take into account the possible allies and/or
adversaries of X in this process. From an access-control point of view, a question like “can my
adversaries access my private data without my consent ?” is much more interesting than a question
like “can my adversaries access my private data ?” , which is usually true because nothing prevents
me from granting them the access.
It is not only interesting to know if something can or will happen, but also if some agent(s) can control the
evolution of the system in order to enforce a given property, whatever the other agents do.
4.3.1.1 Syntax
Partially inspired from the alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) [AHK97] the syntax chosen for the re-
quirements specification language is shown in figure 4.15. This syntax attempts to be rich enough to express
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the most commonly encountered requirements while staying as simple as possible to be understandable
without too much effort by the developers.
A requirement consists of a property (here labelled agentProp) to be satisfied under some hypothesis (the
domain element). The specified property can be a simple permission (or prohibition) or more complex
structures like restricted branching time logic properties or agent-dependent properties.
• a requirement represents a property (here labelled prop) to be satisfied under certain circumstances
(labelled domain).
• a domain represents the preconditions of a property. It can be a simple predicate or more complex
structures like a conjunction of domains or the negation of a domain. For readability purposes, a
domain can also be written using parenthesis.
• a prop element represents a property. It can be either a direct permission (labelled localProp), a
temporal property, an agent-related property or a conjunction/disjunction/negation of properties.
• a localProp represents a simple permission (allowed(· · · )) or prohibition (not allowed(· · · )).
• a timeProp represents a temporal property, i.e. a property applying to the present or to one (or many)
future state(s) of the system.
• finally, an agentProp is a property specifying the set of users to be considered for the satisfaction of
the defined property. The syntactic element alone(A, prop) specifies that the prop property should
be satisfied only by the actions of agent A, whatever other agents can do on the system. Similarly,
together({A+} , prop) specifies that the set of agents {A+} should be able to enforce prop by their
own actions.
The timeProp element now(· · · ) is introduced only for readability purposes and can be omitted. The same
applies to the agentProp element alone(A, prop) when it is used withA referring to the default considered
user. They have been introduced in the syntax only to make it as regular as possible, easing the learning
curve of the language for developers.
This simple syntax allows us to define complex properties like liveness enforcement or context-dependent
requirements. Let us illustrate these possibilities.
administrator(X) : alone(X, alwayswill( allowed(X, Op, Ob )))
This property expresses the fact that “an administrator should always have access to any object on the sys-
tem”. Any user satisfying the precondition (hence being an administrator) should have a strategy to enforce
that he will always be able to access any object on the system, whatever other users on the system can do,
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requirement :: domain : prop
domain :: predicate | domain & domain
| ~ domain | (domain)
prop :: localProp | timeProp | agentProp
| prop & prop | prop || prop | ~prop
localProp :: allowed(S, Op, Ob)
| not allowed(S, Op, Ob)
timeProp :: now(prop) (*)
| may(prop)
| alwayswill(prop)
agentProp :: alone(A, prop) (*)
| together({A+}, prop)
Figure 4.15: Requirement specification language.
Properties marked with a (*) are considered default properties and can be
omitted.
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possibly attempting to prevent him to access the object.
cashier(X) & supervisor(Y, X) & work(X,Z) & special(Z)
: may(alone(X, not allowed(Y,_,Z)))
This property states that, under some specific circumstances (expressed by the domain predicate special(Z)),
a cashier may be allowed to punctually prevent his supervisor from accessing some of his work.
1. object(S) : alwayswill(may(allowed(X,_,S))
2. object(S) : alwayswill(alone(X,may(allowed(X,_,S)))
These requirements act as a liveness enforcement system on the object S for user X: they enforce that, at
any time, someone will have the possibility to access the object. The difference between the two is that the
second one guarantees that, at any time, X will have a strategy on his own to access S, while the first one
may require actions from any other agents on the system.
4.3.1.2 Semantics
The semantics of this language is defined through the mapping of the different constructs to ATL logic
formulas. In the following, the notation JXKY will refer to the semantics of the X element, considering the
contextual set of agents Y . JXK_ indicates that the contextual set of agents is irrelevant to the considered
element.
• a requirement is a property to be satisfied under the specified hypothesis :
Jdomain : agentPropK_ = JdomainK_ ∧ JagentPropKAgt
• a domain is a simple propositional logic formula :
JpK_ = pJdomain&domainK_ = JdomainK_ ∧ JdomainK_J∼ domainK_ = ¬JdomainK_J(domain)K_ = JdomainK_
• the boolean operators on the properties behave as usual :
Jp1 & p2KC = Jp1KC ∧ Jp2KC
Jp1 || p2KC = Jp1KC ∨ Jp2KC
J∼ pKC = ¬JpKC
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• a localProp is a permission or prohibition valid on the current state of the system, it is equivalent to
the presence of the specific permission/prohibition in the permission matrix.
Jallowed(S,Op,Ob)K_ = can(S,Op,Ob)
Jnot allowed(S,Op,Ob)K_ = cannot(S,Op,Ob)
The can(· · · ) and cannot(· · · ) elements are the same as those presented in section 4.2.2.2.
• a timeProp is a property related to the evolution of the access-control model of the system, it is
mapped almost directly to the corresponding ATL constructs.
Jnow(prop)KC = JpropK_
Jmay(prop)KC = 〈〈C〉〉♦JpropK_
Jalwayswill(prop)KC = 〈〈C〉〉JpropK_
• an agentProp is a property specifying which set of users is to be considered as potential allies in the
process of obtaining the desired property. A property specified through the alone(A, prop) construct
should be reached only via the actions ofA, where a property specified through together({A+}, prop)
should be satisfied through a coordinated action from all the users specified in A+.
Jalone(A, prop)KC = JpropKA
Jtogether({A+}, prop)KC = JpropK{A+}
4.3.2 Expressivity/Limitations
Evaluating the expressiveness of a language is a complex task; from a formal point of view, the requirement
language defined above is strictly less expressive than the full ATL logic (see [LMO07] for an analysis of
the expressiveness of ATL). This difference is mainly due to the absence of the ATL “until” operator in our
requirements language.
However, this language is aimed at developers with little to no knowledge of formal methods. Interviews
among them showed a great deal of confusion with the possible semantics of an ATL-like until operator.
Furthermore, no obvious properties requiring such an operator appeared during the analysis stage preceding
the development of this requirement specification language.
4.3.3 Example
Applying the requirements specification language to the running example defined in section 3.3 could bring
the requirements shown in figure 4.16. It contains two very simple requirements. The first one states that
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any administrator can always access any object on the system, whatever the object or the operation he
wishes to execute are. The second one states that the owner of an object of type CPrivateEvent can
always behave such that he can prevent any other user from accessing his object or, said otherwise, a user
cannot access a private object without explicit approval from the object’s owner.
1 # an administrator can always access any object
2 S.isAdministator() : allowed(S, Op, Ob)
3
4
5 # private events cannot be read without owner’s will
6 class(CPrivateEvent, Ob), X=Ob.owner(), user(Y), X!=Y
7 : alone(X, alwayswill(not allowed(Y, Op, Ob)))
Figure 4.16: Requirements for the running example.
Nothing at this stage prevents the developer from specifying conflicting properties. For instance, the two
properties declared into this example are clearly incompatible : satisfying the first one will almost undoubt-
edly break the seconde one and vice versa. The detection and settling of these conflicts will be done during
the verification stage presented in the next chapter.
4.4 Initial configuration
Specifying the initial state of the system is done in a very straightforward way : developers are required to
provide the return values of all the predicates and functions appearing in the required properties and in the
access-control model extracted from the code. To simplify as much as possible, only true predicates will be
specified, any non-specified one will be considered as false.
This specification will consist in the set of the initial users and objects present on the system at initialization
and a list of the predicates to be considered as true. Figure 4.17 shows the simple syntax : the list of initial
users is specified in line 1, the list of objects in line 2 and the set of predicates to be considered as true
follows.
The generation of such an initial configuration description can be greatly facilitated by a tool. The set of
users and objects explicitly appearing into the requirements and/or the code can be extracted automatically
requiring only limited confirmation from the developers. The same applies to the predicates : the set of
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1 users = U*
2 objects = Ob*
3
4 pred*
Figure 4.17: Initial configuration specification.
predicates declared in the initial configuration is a subset of the predicates appearing in the models; listing
them in the tool allows the developers to select only those relevant and give their truth value, easing the
whole process.
While it may seem unpractical to express all the properties holding on the initial state of the system, it should
be noted that most of the systems only define a very limited number of such static elements. Usually, only a
few “important” elements are defined prior of the initialization of the system, for instance a general admin-
istrator account. All other resources and permissions are then defined at runtime through dedicated methods.
4.4.1 Example
As a quick illustration of this simple initial properties specification, figure 4.18 shows a possible initializa-
tion for the running example from section 3.3. Two users are hard coded at system initialization: a root and
a nobody user. Only one object exists, called sandbox and the only properties to be true at startup will be
that user root is an administrator, any other will be considered false.
1 users = root nobody
2 objects = sandbox
3
4 root.isAdministrator()
Figure 4.18: Initial configuration specification for the running example.
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4.5 System Model
The access-control model defined in the above sections is based on per-object permissions. To model the
full set of permissions governing the system, it is necessary to define how the set of objects and users
populating the system can evolve. More precisely, the permissions to perform actions such as read, write,
execute, grant read, grant write, grant execute, revoke read, revoke write, revoke execute and give on a spe-
cific object are already managed by the model defined in section 4.2.2, but operations like object creation or
user creation / destruction are not3 . The purpose of the simple syntax introduced in this section is twofold:
first to specify the conditions under which those object-less operations can be executed and second, what
are the effects, from an access-control point of view, of the execution of the permitted operations on the
system model (figure 4.19).
1 class C:
2 [pre : create()]*
3 [op : effect]*
4
5 System.users :
6 [pre : create()]*
7 [pre : destroy(u)]*
Figure 4.19: System model syntax.
For each class, the developers are able to define what set of properties is required from the user to be able
to create an object of type C (line 2) and what are the effects of the execution of a specific operation op
on this object.These can be expressed in terms of modified predicates/system variables and/or modified
permissions. The effect element on line 3 expresses the set of system variables changed by the considered
operation as a parallel affectation. For readability purposes, the values of the variables after the operation
are suffixed with a prime symbol. True boolean values can also be omitted. As an illustration, an operation
incrementing an internal counter (labelled V ) by 1 and an operation swapping the value of 2 arguments
could be specified with :
inc() : V ′ = V + 1
swap(A,B) : A′, B′ = B,A
It is important to note here that no preconditions are specified for the operations based on the object (i.e. all
operations but the create() one) in this model. The permissions on such operations are managed through
3As this section does not take into account operations executed on a specific object, the permission to destroy an object is not
present here. It is defined in the class-specific access-control rules from section 4.2.2
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the access-control model defined in section 4.2.2, via allowed(•, give, this) permissions.
The same applies to the System.users pseudo-class which represents the set of users populating the sys-
tem. Any existing user satisfying the requirements expressed in the pre statement can either create a new
user on the system (line 6) or destroy an existing user (line 7). Once the considered objects / users have
been created, they can be granted permissions on / to them through the standard access-control rules.
4.5.1 Example
As an illustration of such a system model in the case of our running example (see section 3.3 for an intro-
duction to the running example), a possible system model could look like the one presented in figure 4.20.
1 class CObject:
2
3 class CEvent, CPrivateEvent, CGroupEvent :
4 user(X) : create()
5 give(X) : this.getOwner()’ = X
6 grant_read(X) : allowed(X, read, this)
7 grant_write(X) : allowed(X, write, this)
8 revoke_read(X) : not allowed(X, read, this)
9 revoke_write(X) : not allowed(X, write, this)
10
11 System.users :
12 X.isAdministrator() : create()
13 X.isAdministrator() : destroy(u)
Figure 4.20: System model for the running example.
This model states that :
• no one is able to create CObject objects (no creation rule appears)
• any user of the system can create a calendar event (i.e. an object of class CEvent, CPrivateEvent
or CGroupEvent) 4.
• the operations grant_read, grant_write, revoke_read and revoke_write have their usual signifi-
cation.
4this rules was written using a few syntactic sugar, preventing the duplication of the same identical rule into the 3 separate classes.
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• the creation and removal of users from the system is only allowed to users flagged as administrators.
Rules in lines 6 to 9 are expressed in compact format, equivalent to the extended syntax :
grant_read(X) : allowed(X, read, this)′ = true
grant_write(X) : allowed(X,write, this)′ = true
revoke_read(X) : notallowed(X, read, this)′ = true
revoke_write(X) : notallowed(X,write, this)′ = true
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This chapter presents model-checking and result reporting techniques applicable to the models and prop-
erties defined in the previous chapter. A quick introduction to the foundations of the logic system used is
presented, followed by the model-checking process in itself. The reporting of the model-checking results
back to the developer is then covered. All these methods are then illustrated on an excerpt from the running
example.
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InitSystemAccess Control Model
Analyzer Results/AnswersRequirements
Figure 5.1: Model-checking.
The model-checking process can dispose of all the available models from the previous chapter : the access-
control model, the requirements specification, the system description and the initial configuration specifica-
tion (figure 5.1). More formally, the access-control model, noted AcM (p. 60), models the rules governing
the access or refusal of access to the system’s objects. It consists in a set of classModels components, each
composed of a set of independent access-control rules modelled as simple implications. The requirements
RM (p. 76) represents the properties expected to be verified by the system. They are modelled as ATL logic
formulas. The initial system configuration IM (p. 81) describes the set of objects, the set of users and the
set of true propositions existing at the initialization of the system. Finally, the system model SM (p. 83)
is a set of class actions description, each modeling the effects of all the possible operations on this class type.
The model-checking and result reporting processes presented in the following sections will basically consist
in two steps. First the requirements RM will be verified on a transition system build from AcM , IM and
SM , then the results of this verification will be reflected back in an appropriate way on the input models
RM , AcM , IM and SM .
5.1 Logic and Properties
This section introduces the syntax and semantics of ATL logic as well as some key properties that will
be used later on in this chapter. The original definitions and model-checking procedures proposed by the
authors in [AHK97] are reproduced here as they will be the foundation of the algorithms proposed in the
following sections. Some useful properties taken from [WWZX09] are also presented.
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Definition 7. [AHK97] The temporal logic ATL (Alternating-time Temporal Logic) is
defined with respect to a finite set Π of propositions and a finite set Σ = {1, · · · , k} of players.
An ATL formula is one of the following:
(S1) p, for propositions p ∈ Π.
(S2) ¬φ or φ1 ∨ φ2, where φ1 and φ2 are ATL formulas.
(S3) 〈〈A〉〉 © φ, 〈〈A〉〉φ, or 〈〈A〉〉φ1 U φ2, where A ⊆ Σ is a set of players, and φ, φ1 and
φ2 are ATL formulas.
The notation “〈〈.〉〉” is a path-quantifier and “©” (next), “” (always) and “ U ” (until) are
temporal operators. An additional notation “♦” (eventually) is used as a shortcut : 〈〈A〉〉♦φ =
〈〈A〉〉 true U φ.
Definition 8. [AHK97] A concurrent game structure is a tuple S = 〈k,Q,Π, pi, d, δ〉 with :
• A natural number k ≥ 1 of agents. Players will be identified with their number 1, · · · , k
and the set {1, · · · , k} of players will be noted Σ.
• Q is a finite set of states.
• Π is a finite set of atomic propositions.
• pi is the labeling function, i.e. for each state q ∈ Q, pi(q) ⊆ Π contains the set of atomic
propositions true at q.
• For each player a ∈ {1, · · · , k} and each state q ∈ Q, a natural number da(q) ≥ 1
of moves available at state q to player a. We identify the moves of player a at state q
with the numbers 1, · · · , da(q). For each state q ∈ Q, a move vector at q is a tuple
〈j1, · · · , jk〉 such that 1 ≤ ja ≤ da(q) for each player a. Given a state q ∈ Q, we write
D(q) for the set {1, · · · , d1(q)} × · · · × {1, · · · , dk(q)} of move vectors. The function
D is called move function.
• For each state q ∈ Q and each move vector 〈j1, · · · , jk〉 ∈ D(q), a state
δ(q, j1, · · · , jk) ∈ Q that results from state q if every player a ∈ {1, · · · , k} chooses
move ja. The function δ is called transition function.
For two states q and q′, q′ is a successor of q if there is a move vector 〈j1, · · · , jk〉 ∈ D(q)
such that q′ = δ(q, j1, · · · , jk). Thus, q′ is a successor of q if and only if whenever the game
is in state q, the players can choose moves so that q′ is the next state. A computation of S is
an infinite sequence λ = q0, q1, q2, q3, · · · of states such that for all positions i ≥ 0 , the state
qi+1 is a successor of the state qi . A computation starting at state q is a q-computation. For
a computation λ and a position i ≥ 0, λ[i], λ[0, i] and λ[i,∞] denote the i-th state of λ, the
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finite prefix q0, q1, · · · , qi of λ, and the infinite suffix qi, qi+1, qi+2, · · · of λ respectively.
Considering a CGS S = 〈k,Q,Π, pi, d, δ〉 with Σ = 1, · · · , k, a strategy for player a ∈ Σ is
a function fa that maps every nonempty finite state sequence λ ∈ Q+ to a natural number such
that if the last state of λ is q, then fa(λ) ≤ da(q). Given a state q ∈ Q, a set A ⊆ {1, · · · , k}
of players and a set Fa = {fa|a ∈ A} of strategies, one for each player in A, the outcomes
of FA from q is the set out(q, FA) of q-computations that the players in A enforce when they
follow the strategy. That is, a computation λ = q0, q1, q2, · · · is in out(q, FA) if q0 = q and for
all positions i ≥ 0, there is a move vector 〈j1, · · · , jk〉 ∈ D(qi) such that (1) fa = fa(λ [0, i])
for all players a ∈ A and (2) δ(qi, j1, · · · , jk) = qi+1.
The formal semantics of ATL can then be expressed. With S, q |= φ indicating that the state q
satisfies the formula φ in the structure S, the satisfaction relation |= is defined inductively, for
all states q of S, as follows :
• q |= p, for propositions p ∈ Π, iff p ∈ pi(q).
• q |= ¬ψ iff q|=ψ
• q |= ψ1 ∨ ψ2 iff q |= ψ1 or q |= ψ2
• q |= 〈〈A〉〉 © ψ iff there exists a set FA of strategies, one for each player in A, such that
for all computations λ ∈ out(q, FA), λ [1] |= ψ
• q |= 〈〈A〉〉ψ iff there exists a set FA of strategies, one for each player in A, such that
for all computations λ ∈ out(q, FA) and all positions i ≥ 0, λ [i] |= ψ.
• q |= 〈〈A〉〉ψ1 U ψ2 iff there exists a set FA of strategies, one for each player in A, such
that for all computations λ ∈ out(q, FA) there exists a position i ≥ 0 such that λ [i] |= ψ2
and for all positions 0 ≥ j < i, λ [j] |= ψ1
The authors then provide a symbolic model-checking algorithm and show [AHK97, Thm. 5.2]
that the model-checking problem for ATL is PTIME-complete, and can be solved in time
O(m.l) for a game structure with m transitions and an ATL formula of length l. They also
state that the problem is PTIME-hard even for a fixed formula, and even in the special case
of turn-based synchronous game structures. However, the model-checking algorithm and the
accompanying results require the CGS to be fully generated, with all the states and transitions
created, which can in itself be a hard problem.
The reader interested in a more in-depth presentation and analysis of ATL can refer to [AHK97], [GvD06],
[vdHLW06] and [LMO07] for an exhaustive analysis of ATL model-checking complexity.
CHAPTER 5. MODEL VERIFICATION 91
5.2 Verification Algorithms
The model-checking and result reporting techniques presented in the following sections are based on the
original symbolic model-checking algorithm for ATL from [AHK97]. As such, it requires us to build a
explicit CGS S = 〈k,Q,Π, pi, d, δ〉 representing the considered systems. The construction of the various
components of this CGS from the different models RM , AcM , IM and SM extracted from the system is
described in the following pages.
Before entering the CGS construction process in itself, it should be noted that building the explicit CGS
requires a fixed (and finite) set of agents, actions and propositions. This does not represent a problem for the
actions and the propositions, which are extracted from the models. On the contrary, the agents are dynamic
entities that can be created and destroyed during the system evolution through the dedicated operations
specified in the system model SM . To allow the agent set to be treated as a fixed set, it was partitioned
into a set of active agents, i.e. agents that have been introduced into the game and are allowed to per-
form some operations depending on the permissions they have received, and a set of inactive agents, who
can only perform the no-operation action (NOP) until they are properly introduced into the game (figure
5.2). The same kind of technique is applied to the other dynamic set: the set of objects present in the system.
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Figure 5.2: Agent set is partitioned into active and inactive ones.
The set Π of atomic propositions consists of the collection and instantiation of all the atomic proposi-
tions encountered in the various models. It contains all the atomic permissions (the can(•, •, •) and
cannot(•, •, •) propositions) generated from the permissions specification as well as all the instances of
the observable properties specified in the system model and the access-control model.
The set k of players is constructed from the list of users specified in the initial system model IM , completed
with a set of abstract “inactive” players dedicated to the semantics of the user creation methods found in
the system model SM . As explained above, inactive players are players whose only enabled operation on
the system is NOP (no-operation) and have no permissions at all. They can be turned into active players,
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able to receive permissions and perform operations on objects, through the execution of the dedicated agent
creation operation by an already active player.
The move function d is constructed from the conjunction of the access-control model AcM and the system
model SM : for a state q ∈ Q and an agent a, da(q) contains the list of actions permitted for agent a.
This list is built from the evaluation of the access-control model in state q : every permission granted opens
access to the operation semantics associated with the considered object in SM .
The set of states Q, the transition function δ and the labeling function pi are built inductively through a sim-
ple state-space exploration (algorithm 4). Starting from the initial stateQ0 built from the initial system state
model IM , states are processed one by one until state-space exhaustion. The algorithm works as follows: a
state R is selected from the set of reached but not yet analyzed states then, for every possible move vector
applicable to that state, the destination state is added to the res accumulator and its true propositions are set
according to the semantics of the state operations defined in the system model SM . The sets of processed
and yet-to-analyze states are then updated appropriately. For simplicity of the algorithm, states are suposed
to include their set of true propositions, giving the direct consequence q1 = q2 ⇒ pi(q1) = pi(q2).
Algorithm 4 STATE SPACE GENERATION
1: O←− Q0
2: Q←− ∅
3: pi(Q0)←− init
4: while O 6= ∅ do
5: R←− pick(O)
6: res←− ∅
7: for each v ∈ D(q) do
8: res←− res⋃ δ(Q, v)
9: pi(δ(Q, v))←− update(pi(Q),effects(Q, v))
10: end for
11: Q←− Q⋃R
12: O ←− (O⋃ res)\Q
13: end while
The explicit CGS generated through algorithm 4 can be large. A system containing k agents, o objects,
n actions and p different observable predicates can lead to the production of np = k × o × n different
permissions and no = p × k different observables, leading to a state space counting O(P(np) × P(no))
states. However, this high upper bound is rarely a problem in real systems models : only the subset of the
state-space reachable from the initial state Q0 is built and checked.
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Furthermore, simulating the system does not always require to take into account large numbers of users,
objects or properties. On the one hand, usually only a few of them are sufficient disprove the desired re-
quirements. On the other hand, proving a property satisfied requires to analyse all the potential reachable
states and can quickly turn impractical without properly bounding the problem. These bounds on the num-
ber of objects and subjects in the simulation are provided as parameters to the verification routines.
The main drawback of this choice is that, while negative results (violated properties) can be obtained quite
fast, obtaining complete positive results (thus holding properties) can take quite a long time. Even worse,
too strict bounds on objects and subjects set can lead to false positives. Inserting the right bounds values
requires some experience with the algorithm and sometimes some trial.
5.3 Reporting Verification Results
The next step after the verification of the properties on the generated model is to report the results back to
the originals models and, through the weaving process, back into the executable source code.
Depending on the verification results, two distinct situations occur : either none of the properties have been
disproved or some of them have failed the verification. The first case is of little interest in the context of this
work : if all the desired properties are satisfied, then the source code does not need any corrective measure,
so end the reporting process. On the other hand, if some properties are disproved, corrective measures
should be proposed to the developer. Simply forwarding the model-checking results directly back to the
user does not satisfy our basic requirements stating that the target user should not need to be familiar with
formal methods and verification techniques.
The verification results have to be reported back to the user in a easily understandable way. Our target
audience being source code developers, we will attempt to provide corrective measure directly to the code
(through the weaving process of the acces-control model) every time it is possible.
More formally, a property p fromRM which fails the verification process is a property such that there exists
a q0-computation λ : ∃i ≥ 0 : (∀j < i : λ [j] |= p) ∧ (λ [i]|= p), i.e. a property that admits an execution
trace running from the initial state (q0) to a state violating the property (λ [i]) (figure 5.3). For each prop-
erty, the set of offending states, and the execution traces leading to them, have to be analyzed and proper
corrective measures proposed on the access-control model AcM . The remaining of this section will tackle
each of these possible outcomes individually, plus another one closely related to the iterative development
scheme. Then a practical combined approach will be presented.
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a
Figure 5.3: Property violation : execution trace
5.3.1 Requirements level
The most obvious, and probably the most human, way to circumvent the violation of a requirement p by a
model m is to remove or adapt the conflicting property such that the violation disappears (figure 5.4).
InitSystemAccess Control Model
Analyzer Results/AnswersRequirements
Figure 5.4: Reporting verification results back to the requirements
Removing the conflicting property from the set of requirements is a trivial solution to the violation and,
in general, should not be admitted. This should never happen unless the considered property was mis-
specified or does not reflect any more the clients requirements. Removing a property means to miss some
of the clients requirements, and thus producing code not conformant to what was intended. However, expe-
rience shows that this behavior happens in almost every software project : time and cost constraints often
impose to make choices during the development stages. Many software projects deliver incomplete systems
which will be patched “later on” to correct the missing or incomplete features.
A more fine-grained approach to this problem is to correct the property to remove the violation. Considering
the offending q0-computation leading to the violation, a straightforward solution is to modify the property
p such that it does not apply anymore in offending state λ [i]. Based on the structure of the property p
(see p. 76), two scenarios are possible : if p is a localProp element (p. 80), thus a property without
temporal or agent operator, preventing the violation in state λ [i] can be done by strengthening the pre-
conditions of the property such that it does not apply anymore in the offending state. Modifying p from
’p = domain : localProp’ to ’p′ = domain& ¬(pi(λ [i])) : localProp’ will prevent the conflict.
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On the other hand, if p is a temporal property (a timeProp element) or an agent specification property (an
agentProp element) , there is no straightforward corrective measure to be proposed. Depending on what
the signification of the violated property is and confronted to the violation trace, the developer can decide
to adopt one or more of the following strategies :
• strengthen the preconditions of the property to prevent the appearance of the violation execution trace.
• enlarge or reduce the coalition of agents responsible of the enforcement of the property (in the case
of an agentProp element)
• modify the property to take into account the violating scenario (for instance, modifying a property
always(p) with the addition of an alternative to reflect some situation, like in always(p ∨ q))
• completely rewrite the property to avoid the violation.
• ...
As a special case, if the property has been violated since the first step of the trace (i.e. if (λ [0] = q0)|=p), it
means that the initial state, as defined in the initial system model IM , conflicts with the considered property.
The resolution process remains the same.
Excepted for the case of the simple local requirement, the process of choosing the most adapted alternative
for a specific violation cannot be automated : only the author of the offended property can decide which
alternatives are the most adapted to the situation. The verification routines can only provide him an execu-
tion trace leading to the violation of the property and show him what are the consequences of the changes
he makes.
5.3.2 Access-control level
Reporting the results of the verification back to the access-control model (figure 5.5), and also back to the
code thanks to the weaving process, requires to identify precisely which access-control rules fromAcM have
allowed the actions taken to put the system into the violating state.
System InitAccess Control Model
Analyzer Results/AnswersRequirements
Figure 5.5: Reporting verification results back to the access-control model.
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The execution trace violating property p, λ : ∃i ≥ 0 : (∀j < i : λ [j] |= p) ∧ (λ [i]|= p) gives a hint on
the operations which might have compromised the property. The set of actions (one for each agent) that
triggered the transition from the last state satisfying the property p to the offending state (labelled λ [i]) is
given by the transition function : λ [i] = δ(λ [i− 1] , j1, · · · , jk). Identifying the access-control rules that
have allowed the different agents to perform those actions is pretty straightforward :
1. we identify the set of propositions modified in the transition : the set P+ contains the propositions in-
troduced in the violating state, while the set P− contains the propositions which have been removed.{
P+ = pi(λ [i])\pi(λ [i− 1])
P− = pi(λ [i− 1])\pi(λ [i])
2. we identify the sets of propositions, called V that cause the violation of the property p :
∀s ∈ P(P+ ∪ P−) : if (pi(λ [i− 1]) ∪ s)|=p then V ←− V ∪ {s}
i.e. we search for subsets s of the set of modified propositions, such that the addition of s to the
previous (satisfying p) state is sufficient to make it violate p.
3. we restrict these sets of propositions to their most significative elements (in Off ):
Off = {o ∈ V |∀v ∈ (V \o) : v⊂o}
4. then for each of these sets of significative propositions :
(a) we identify in the system model SM the set of actions A from (j1, · · · , jk) that have caused
these modifications. A = {(ai, opi, obi)|i = 1, · · · , n} with (a, op, ob) representing the action
for agent a to perform operation op on object ob.
(b) we identify the access-control rule responsible for the permission to perform each of the offend-
ing actions :
R =
{
r ∈ AcM : JrKλ[i] ⇒ can(a, op, ob)|(a, op, ob) ∈ A}
Note that the rules in AcM do not overlap (due to the adapted union operator
M⋃
).
(c) then we update each rule in c : perm ∈ R to prevent it to grant the permission can(a, op, ob)
authorizing the action leading to the violation of the considered property.
• either we prohibit agent a (or a generalization of it) to benefit from the permission granted
by the rule r :
r =
{
c ∧ propa : ¬perm
c ∧ ¬propa : perm
• either we prohibit the rule r to apply in state λ [i− 1]
r =
{
c ∧ pi(λ [i− 1]) : ¬perm
c ∧ ¬pi(λ [i− 1]) : perm
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• or a mix of both.
5. or we generate a fresh access-control rule preventing the violation of p = (c : a) :
F = (c ∧ ¬(P+ ∪ P−) : a)
The modifications obtained on the model can then be showed either directly to the developer, or be turned
into executable code through the weaving process, leaving him with the choice between all proposed alter-
natives.
5.3.3 Status Quo
This option differs from the previous ones : in the status quo alternative, the developer acknowledges the
property violation, but takes no action to solve it. This behavior usually appears in iterative development
schemes, where all features of the system, although being specified in the requirements, might not be fully
implemented yet when the source code is verified.
The execution trace leading to the violation is simply forwarded to the developer “as-it-is”, as a remainder
for the unresolved violation to be taken care of later in the development stages.
5.3.4 Practical approach
In practical situations, the verification routines on the models cannot, by themselves, decide which correc-
tive measure among those proposed best fit the requirements and wish of the developer.
The same holds for the level of abstraction to be used inside the rules. While some developers won’t mind if
the number of access-control rules increases as long as each of them stays relatively small and understand-
able, others will attempt to generalize as much as possible each encountered rule modification in order to
maintain the rule set as small as possible.
To fit both of these behaviors, and any in-between, we limit ourselves to the production of a set of possible
corrective measures for each violated property. The developer is then free to choose which one to apply, or
to implement his own fix (figure 5.6) . Furthermore, the developer is sometimes required to implement the
corrective measure by himself, for instance when some properties conflict with the initial system configu-
ration.
Keeping the developer inside the feed-back loops not only permit to decide which modification to apply, but
also allows him to keep full control over his source code : the effects of the proposed changes are directly
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Figure 5.6: Selection of the most appropriated options among the sets of proposed corrective measures.
visible on the source code and/or the required properties.
5.3.5 Generalization
The techniques presented above tend to produce explicit rules (both for the requirement model and for
the access-control model). These rules can often be simplified through the generalization of some of their
elements. Consider for example the following access-control rules:
1. p & q(a) : perma
2. p & q(b) : permb
3. p & q(c) : permc
It might be tempting to collapse them into a single rule, generalizing the argument appearing in the q pred-
icate from the precondition, which would give the rule : p & q(X) : permX .
However, this process has two major drawbacks : first it enlarge the semantics of the rule to elements that
were not part of it. For instance, an element d potentially failing q(d) might receive a permission in the gen-
eralized rule while the sequential ones would have forbid it. Secondly, the access-control rules are closely
tied to the developer’s source code. He might have a very good reason for replicating the rules, for instance,
each rule might be accompanied by a comment justifying the existence of the code block behind the rule.
The verification and the result reporting routines have no way to prevent these problems. For this reason, we
limit ourselves to the production of generalized rules in addition to the explicit rules created above. They
will appear as extra alternatives to choose from to the developer.
5.4 Example
This section provides an illustration of the proposed methodology and result reporting techniques detailed
above on the running example introduced page 51. The related models can be found in figures 4.11 to
4.14 (page 71) for the access-control model of the various source class files, figure 4.16 (page 81) for the
CHAPTER 5. MODEL VERIFICATION 99
requirements specification, figure 4.20 (page 84) for the system model and figure 4.18 (page 82) for the
initial system configuration.
A simple execution trace like :
root -> John = System.user.create()
John -> ob = CPrivateEvent.create()
where the administrator, defined in the system initialization model, creates a user named John, who then
create a private calendar event (an CPrivatEvent object), is sufficient to break the first of the two proper-
ties required on the system. The access-control rules defined on this kind of objects only allow the object’s
owner to access them, thus preventing the administrator from reaching them.
This behavior breaches the “S.isAdministator() : allowed(S, Op, Ob)” property defined
in the requirements, stating that an administrator can always perform any operation on any object.
There are two options to solve this property violation : either modify the requirements and avoid the con-
flicting situation, or modify the access-control rules governing the access to the private object.
• on the requirements level, if we omit the trivial solution of removing the violated rule, the only
option is to modify the rule such that it does not apply anymore in the offending situation. In the
considered case, it means strengthening the rule preconditions with the generalized negation of one
of the properties valid in the offending state :
(...)
root.isAdministrator()
ob.owner = John
ob.class = CPrivateEvent
(...)
This leads to the generation of the following modified access-control rules:
R1. S.isAdministator() & ¬ (S.isAdministrator()) : allowed(S, Op, Ob)
R2. S.isAdministator() & ¬ (Ob.owner = John) : allowed(S, Op, Ob)
R3. S.isAdministator() & ¬ (Ob.class = CPrivateEvent) : allowed(S, Op, Ob)
The first rule is clearly useless as its preconditions conflicts each other and can be ignored. On the
other hand, rules 2 and 3 propose interesting requirement limitations : rule 2 states that an admin-
istrator can access any object but John’s ones, while the third one states that the administrator can
access any object on the system, but private ones.
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• on the access-control level, the rules modification will fail to provide useful elements (the create()
operation considered here is a bit special : it is not restricted by a permission). On the other hand, the
ad-hoc rule creation rule will produce the two following items :
M1. S.isAdministator() & (Ob.owner = John) : allowed(S, Op, Ob)
M2. S.isAdministator() & (Ob.class = CPrivateEvent) : allowed(S, Op, Ob)
M1 allows an administrator to access objects owned by John and M2 allows an administrator to
access private objects (i.e. objects from the CPrivateObject class).
At the end of the process, the developer is confronted with the execution trace violating the required prop-
erty and the 5 corrective options R1, R2, R3,M1 and M2. Rules M1 and M2 are proposed either under
their access-control model form or directly weaved back into code fragments. As an illustration, figures
5.7 and 5.8 show such code fragments, respectively, for M1 and M2. The developer is then free to choose
which proposition(s) should be accepted (into the requirements model and/or into the code), or to modify
them / implement his own solution to resolve the conflict.
1 public class CPrivateEvent extends CEvent {
2 (...)
3 public boolean isAuthorized(CSubject requestor, COperation op ) {
4 // M1
5 if (requestor.isAdministator())
6 if (this.owner == John)
7 return true;
8 return requestor.equals(this.owner);
9 }
10 (...)
11 }
Figure 5.7: Proposition M1 weaved into the code.
It is important to note that, as our proposed methodology considers the requirements one at a time, some
of the potential corrective measures proposed at one stage can conflict with other previous or following
requirements. For instance, in the above example, applying any of the proposed solution will break the
second system requirements :
# private events cannot be read without owner’s will
class(CPrivateEvent, Ob), X=Ob.owner(), user(Y), X!=Y : alone(X, always(not allowed(Y, Op, Ob)))
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1 public class CPrivateEvent extends CEvent {
2 (...)
3 public boolean isAuthorized(CSubject requestor, COperation op ) {
4 // M2
5 if (requestor.isAdministator())
6 return true;
7 return requestor.equals(this.owner);
8 }
9 (...)
10 }
Figure 5.8: Proposition M2 weaved into the code.
The test “(Ob.class = CPrivateEvent)” was redundant and is omitted to
preserve readability.
Which is quite expectable as the two requirements specified on our considered system clearly conflict with
each other.
This question of potentially conflicting requirements in not explicitly adressed in this document. Con-
flicting requirements are more a specification problem than a problem related to an access-control policy
implementation.
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This chapter presents the techniques used to weave back the extracted (and possibly modified) access-
control model back into the executable code. A first naive but straightforward implementation of the weav-
ing process will be presented and discussed followed by an improved version. Then a set of possible further
optimisations and perspectives, improving the quality and readability of the produced code, will be intro-
duced.
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6.1 AC Model Weaving
By opposition to the extraction algorithms presented in section 4.2.3.2 (p. 68), which extract an access-
control model from the source code, the weaving algorithms presented in this section take an access-control
model as main input and produce executable code implementing the semantics of the model (figure 6.1).
Access Control Model
Weaver
++ Source
CodeCode
Source
Figure 6.1: AC Model weaving.
The term ’weaving’ comes from the Aspect Oriented Programming paradigm [KLM+97] and is used here
with the same semantics. It denotes the conversion of the access-control model into executable code clauses
and their introduction at an appropriate location into the source code. The conversion from the model to
executable code and the insertion of this code into the existing application tries to modify the existing code
as little as possible, produce human-readable statements and attempt no to modify unnecessary elements.
6.1.1 Naive approach
A naive implementation of the weaving process is, for each rule appearing in each classModel in the
model, to produce a code statement implementing the permission (see algorithm 5). Then the generated
statements overwrite the possibly existing content of the authorization method in the executable source
code.
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Algorithm 5 WEAVING(M)
1: for all class C ∈ m do
2: for each rule r ∈ C do
3: if r ≡ (pre : allowed(S,Op,Ob)) then
4: RV←− true
5: else
6: {r ≡ pre : not allowed(S,Op,Ob)}
7: RV←− false
8: end if
9: produce( “if (pre) then return RV;”)
10: end for
11: end for
This algorithm produces executable code implementing the access-control model, however, it makes the
code completely unreadable and unmaintainable. Much like what is done in most popular AOP implemen-
tations, the resulting source code is only meant to be compiled and executed, not manually edited. This
goes against the primary objectives targeted by our approach : the model extraction, its verification and the
weaving of the model back into the code should leave the code as human-readable as possible such that the
developer keep total control and full understanding over it.
6.1.2 Improved approach
A first obvious improvement to the algorithm shown above is to better use the structures of the rules found
in the access-control model. Algorithm 5 considers the rules as independent items, which is most of the
time false, especially if those rules are the result of the extraction algorithms presented in section 4.2.3.2 (p.
68). The weaving process being almost the inverse of the extraction process, adapting a reversed version of
algorithm 1 gives the more efficient weaving algorithm 6.
[l. 1-3] It extracts the access-control rule setR found in each class present in the model
m. Z is an accumulator which will store the sequence of all the elements to be
weaved into the final source code.
[l. 4-5] The rules found in the rule set are analyzed one by one to reverse the effect of
algorithm 2 :
[l. 6-8] If the current rule (and it’s successor in the table R) are the result of the dis-
junctive clause they are merged back together and we skip the next rule.
[l. 10-14] Otherwise we simply reverse the effects of algorithm.
[l. 17] The executable code corresponding to the rules found is produced (see below
for details).
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The genCode(C,Z) generates access-control code for the C class from the rules contained in Z. It groups
rules based on common prefixes while preserving their ordering, this prevent meaningless code replica-
tion and keeps the output code as readable as possible. Figure 6.2 illustrates this process with a source
Z = (A,B,C : T ), (A,B,D : F ), (A,E;T ), (A,−E,F : F ), showing, on the left hand part, a rule per
rule code generation and, on the right hand side, a common prefix factoring.
Algorithm 6 WEAVING(M) - V2
1: for all class C ∈ m do
2: R←− rules(C)
3: Z←− ∅
4: for i = 1 to #R do
5: {R[i] ≡ (class(C, Ob) ∧ Q) −→ Action}
6: if (i < #R)∧( R[i+1]≡ (class(C, Ob) ∧Q’)−→ not Action )∧(Q = A∧X)∧(Q′ = A∧¬X))
then
7: Z←−+ (A, return(X) )
8: i←− i+ 1
9: else
10: if (Action ≡ allowed(requestor, Op, Ob) then
11: Z←−+ (Q, return(true))
12: else
13: Z←−+ (Q, return(false))
14: end if
15: end if
16: end for
17: genCode(C, Z)
18: end for
1 if (A & B & C) return(true);
2 if (A & B & D) return(false);
3 if (A & E) return(true);
4 if (A & not E & F) return(false);
1 if (A)
2 if (B)
3 if (C) return(true);
4 if (D) return(false);
5 if (E) return(true);
6 else if (F) return(true);
Figure 6.2: generate(C,Z) : unstructured Vs structured output.
CHAPTER 6. MODEL WEAVING 107
6.1.3 Effects on existing code
Even though the method presented here tries to have as little impact as possible on the existing code, nothing
guarantees that cycling through the extraction and weaving stages does not alter presentation of the source
code (figure 6.3). The implemented semantics stays constant but the appearance of the code as well as the
constructs used can vary, which may greatly disturb the developer. This gives him the feeling that he is
losing control over his own code, not recognizing anymore some of the constructs he had built into it.
!
Access Control Model
Weaver
Security Aspect Extractor
Miner
Code
++ Source
Figure 6.3: Iterating the extraction and weaving processes.
Iterating the extraction and weaving processes produces equivalent code
instead of leaving the code unchanged.
These unintended variations in the code presentation and the different possible ways to prevent them are the
source of the optimization techniques presented in the next section.
6.1.4 Example
As an illustration, weaving back into the code the access-control model extracted from the CGroupEvent
class (figure 4.14) gives the source code shown in figure 6.4.
The generated code differs slightly from the original source code (see figure 3.10 for the original source
code), but implements the same semantics. The difference lies in the lines 8 and 9 : in the original source
code, the two tests are combined inside one single if construct, where our weaving process has split them
on two consecutive ones.
While such slight differences will probably not disturb too much the developer when he will try to update
his code, their accumulation might slowly obfuscate the code. The next section will present some tech-
niques aimed at removing these unwanted side-effects.
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1 public class CGroupEvent extends CEvent {
2 (...)
3 public boolean isAuthorized(CSubject requestor, COperation op ) {
4 if (super.isAuthorized(requestor, op)) return(true);
5
6 if (owner.isGroup())
7 if (requestor.equals(owner.getOwner())) return true;
8 else if (owner.isMember(requestor))
9 if (op == COperation.READ) return(true);
10
11 return false;
12 }
13 (...)
14 }
Figure 6.4: CGroupEvent class : model weaved back to code.
6.2 Possible optimisations
This section provide two possible further optimizations techniques applicable to the extraction and weav-
ing algorithms presented in the above sections in order to improve their preciseness and limit as much as
possible unintended code structure alteration.
6.2.1 Pragmas
The first way to optimize the extraction and weaving processes is to allow them to better cooperate in their
respective tasks. Most of the time, the model to be weaved into the code is very close, at least for some
parts of it, to the model that was extracted from the code. Letting the extractor efficiently communicate to
the weaver what code portions resulted in what model rules allows the weaver to simply recopy the code
fragments whose model has not been modified (figure 6.5). This allows to preserve the structure and the
formatting of those code elements, reducing the risk of loss of control of the developer over his code.
These pragmas can either be automatically inserted into the code and the model or be manually edited by
the developer. For instance, automatic pragma could be used to delimit the code fragment responsible for
a specific rule found in the model, or specify how to interpret some complex code statement. Although the
latter would break the minimal developer intervention policy our approach try to enforce. This would allow
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Figure 6.5: Communication through pragma.
a fine tuning of the extraction and weaving processes according to the developer desires.
6.2.2 Assisted extraction/weaving
A second optimization technique is to shift from an automatic code extraction and weaving processes to
manually assisted ones. When confronted to complex code structures or unexpected behaviors, the tools
could interact with the developer to select the correct action to be taken.
These interventions could consist in the replacement of unsupported instructions, like loops, the rewriting
of complex nested code structures, ... Not only would this ease the automatic manipulation of the code
for the extraction and weaving processes, but it would also help the developer to clarify some potentially
obscure parts of his sources and make them conformant to his own coding conventions.
This assisted behavior also plays an important role in the specification of the initial configuration model and
of the system model. The tool can collect all the static references done to users and objects into the access-
control rules and insert them in the ad-hoc models. The same goes for the permissions and the predicates
appearing in mode rules.
6.3 Weaving to another model
A nice potential extension of the weaving process lies in the possibility to weave the access-control model,
not directly into the code, but into external and dedicated components and replace the contents of the AC-
checking methods in the source code by calls to these external components (figure 6.6).
This would go beyond one of our initial objectives, namely the intent to leave the code as untouched as
possible, allowing the developer to keep full control over it at all times. But it would allow the developer to
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quite easily delegate the AC of his application to dedicated components and technologies. The extracted AC
model could then be checked/monitored using other verification methods, for example the JAAS framework
[Ora11].
In a way, such a behavior would come close to the aspectization approach found in [TNTN11]. It would
extract a particular functional aspect of the source code (here the access-control one) into an aspect in the
sense of AOP.
Access Control Model
Weaver
++ Source
Code
Higher−level
Model
Figure 6.6: Extraction of the access-control model.
Such an extension would be a interesting feature and would allow the access-control elements not only to
be extracted, but also to be refactored and optimized. It would represent a nice and easy first step towards
the use of formal methods to improve the code structure and behavior.
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This chapter summarizes and evaluates the achievements of the previous chapters against the objectives de-
fined in chapter 3. It presents the knowledge and feed-back obtained during the application of the proposed
methodology to the case study, followed by some general reviews on the presented approach. Paths for
potential future improvements are then introduced.
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7.1 Case study feed-back
The application of the proposed access-control modeling and verification techniques on a limited “commer-
cial” subsystem of our source case study exacerbated both the pro’s and con’s our approach showed on the
presented running example. This section details the most notable feed-backs received.
7.1.1 Pro’s
The presence of a formal methodology requiring a clear and precise specification of the system to be writ-
ten encouraged the developers to maintain it as up-to-date as possible. Turning the specification from a
document “redacted before implementation and then left aside” to a close companion of the code gives
an opportunity to encourage continuous reflection on the implemented methods. It also limits the risk of
appearance of missing or extra features into the application.
Furthermore, the ability to extract an access-control model directly from the code, modulo some approxi-
mations caused by an approximate coding convention enforcement, allowed to easily manage and discuss
the evolutions of the access-control related sections. As such, it facilitated the co-evolution of the system’s
specification and the implemented features.
Then, the production of execution traces illustrating the detected violations allowed the developers to (al-
most) easily spot the problematic elements. Potential corrections directly provided on the source code level
were seen as an interesting feature but, unfortunately, were not employed very much. Maintenance teams
are trained to detect bugs and fix them directly into the code. When given the execution traces, their first
action was often to fix the code directly, without looking at first to the proposed potential corrections. How-
ever, for more complex situations or when their direct fixes were not as correct as they first thought, they
were inspired from the proposed corrections for their code updates.
Finally, the iterative process of extraction - verification - weaving of the code allowed developers to easily
detect unwanted side-effects of some of the code updates. Early detection of inconsistencies between source
code at revision n and revision n + 1 was possible through the comparison of the access-control models
extracted from both revisions. By contrast to code-revision managements systems like CVS or SVN which
can only provide the syntactic differences between two versions of the source code, the difference between
the two extracted access-control models help pinpoint the semantic differences.
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7.1.2 Con’s
The first drawback of the approach lies in the time (and effort) required to provide the first interesting re-
sults. By opposition to testing, which produces almost immediately tangible scenarios applicable to the
system, verification requires the developers to write several models of their system prior to any results.
Even though some elements were automatically extracted from the source code, this step seemed overly
redundant to them: in their minds, a system able to extract an access-control model from the code should
also be able to extract the system model and any other required element. Redacting and maintaining those
additional models appeared to be an extra “unproductive” cost counter-balancing the potential advantages
of the verification.
Another problematic elements are the format code modifications induced as side-effects by the extraction-
weaving loop. These modification tend to obfuscate the code. Even though the code produced is function-
ally equivalent to the original one, it was very frustrating for some developer to see their code appearance
changed. It reduces the readability of some of the code segments and makes their manual correction more
complex, even for the original source code author.
Furthermore, the need to strictly respect the coding conventions to allow the access-control model to be
extracted was sometimes seen as a huge burden. Although these coding conventions were the ones used
by the developers themselves before the introduction of our methodology (with some minor modifications),
their habit was to follow the coding conventions as much as possible, not strictly. The respect of the con-
ventions was encouraged everywhere posible, but not sanctioned if small violations were done in limited
and justified contexts.
Then, the verification is only as good as the requirements are: specified properties can be checked and, if
applicable the code can be corrected to fit them. But a quick bug-tracking analysis showed that most of the
problems related to access-control were not caused by a breach in the main properties. Instead they were
caused by small “obvious” features that no-one ever took the time to specify. This problem is common to
all of the formal methods approaches : it is hard to fully specify all the expected requirement, even more
when the authors of the specification are not keen on formal models.
Finally, applying the methodology requires quite a lot of manpower, specially during the first stages where
the different models have to be prepared. Applying the verification results to the system was most of the
time done without too much problem (albeit the elements cited above), excepted the fact that some of the
alternatives proposed by the result reporting stage are not always easily understandable. This is in particular
true when the alternatives produced are very close from each other; developers sometimes have difficulties
figuring out what was the exact effect of the different propositions. This can cause hesitations on which
alternative to choose.
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7.1.3 Wrap-up
+ -
Execution traces
Usage for the specification
Automated AC extraction
Code version comparison
Time consuming
Code obfuscation
Strict coding conventions
Limited to requirements
Choice between corrections
Figure 7.1: Summary of main pro’s and con’s obtained on the case study.
Figure 7.1 summarizes the feed-back received from the application of our proposed methodology to the
considered case study. From an usage point of view, the introduction of a semi-automated code verification
process inside the development stages allowed the developers to detect some inconsistencies between their
implementation and the underlying requirements. However, the need to build, aside from the source code,
models describing the system appeared to be a harsh and time-consuming task, specially for developers
with no knowledge of formal methods.
Furthermore, due to their background, trainings and past habits, developers often had more confidence in
testing than in results obtained through verification methods. At some points, they even checked manually
the proposed corrections against the violating execution trace to make sure that what was proposed actually
met their requirements.
As a conclusion to the case study, it should be noted that the case study evaluation could not be run till
completion. Various reasons, both internal and external, forced the considered application source code to
evolve to new technologies in a time-scale incompatible with the one of a research project. Participating
developers had to be reaffected to new projects and support inside the organisation was slowly diluted, halt-
ing the case study evaluation process.
7.2 General thoughts
From a more general point of view, the proposed approach did reach some of its objectives : the extraction
of an access-control model from the code, its verification and the weaving of the results back into the code
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is indeed possible and useful in practical situations. However, applying the methodology to other software
projects still requires custom adaptation. Furthermore, the methodology requires a deep developer implica-
tion and the learning of some specification formalisms. The rest of this section details these elements.
The automatic extraction of the access-control model directly from the source code allows the developer to
express the access-control rules in a well-mastered syntax : the one of the chosen implementation language.
As such, it limits the potential mis-understandings that might appear during the rule writing because of an
“exotic” or un-sufficiently mastered formalism. A drawback of this choice lies in the obligation to follow
some coding conventions aimed at facilitating the parsing and interpretation of the source code. They limit
the code constructs that can be used, and force the developer to structure his code following canvas. This
does not cause much trouble when considering a software project from the start, but can be a huge problem
if the methodology is to be applied to an existing project : coding conventions might need to be adapted or
more strictly enforced, leading to potential modifications in the whole considered source code.
Event though the approach tries to hide away as many of the formal methods aspects as possible, it remains
complex and requires the developer to write some of the models by himself. As such, it misses one of the
objectives defined in the beginning of the projet : be transparent to the developer. While some of the mod-
els can probably be automatically extracted from the source code like the access-control one (for instance
the system model), it would require the enforcement of strict coding conventions on a ever larger part of
the source code. This would bring the convention-conformant source code ever closer to a formal model
specification using the syntax of the considered programming language, which is not the objective. In this
aspect, formal methods will always be less intuitive than testing. Testing derives real tangible execution
traces based on some kind of specification or code parsing, these are almost physical concepts. On the other
hand, verification requires an abstraction of the considered system to be done before producing any useful
results.
The same holds for the interpretation of the proposed corrections.The updates to the access-control model
can be presented in a developer-friendly way directly on the source code, but the potential property updates
still require to learn and understand the selected requirement language. This might not be an easy task, spe-
cially when considering temporal properties. There is usually a huge gap in developers minds between the
perception of the semantics of temporal operators and their effective semantics. Local or agent properties
refer to tangible elements found on the system, where temporal operators refer to the behavior of potential
futur executions.
Another limitation of the proposed methodology is that it only verifies that the implemented access-control
methods inside the source code are compliant with the expressed requirements. It does not check that these
access-control methods are effectively called with the proper arguments before the access are granted or
forbidden by the application. It relies entirely on the developer capacity on this point.
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The methodology presented in this document differs from the other approaches existing in the literature.
Existing approaches tend to focus either on the extraction of an access-control model from the source code
then the verification of some properties on the obtained model (see for instance [GSL07]), or they focus on
the verification of some properties on a previously given model then its insertion into the code (for instance
in Aspect Oriented Programming). Combining both approaches in a single loop allows to focus more on the
developer capacities and expectations. Furthermore, keeping the developer inside the decision loop allows
us to benefit from his knowledge to choose the right decision when updating rules and/or requirements.
This allows to produce results more fit to the developer’s needs.
7.3 Adaptability
The work presented in this document is closely tied to the structure and coding conventions encountered in
the case study. In particular, the extraction and weaving components are built to take advantage of the code
structure and coding conventions available on the considered source code.
However, the other components of the methodology were built to be easily adaptable to new systems and
conventions sets. The various models and verification and reporting processes are almost independent from
the source code aspect. They only consider access-control rules granting or forbidding accesses, which
should be able to model almost all of the access-control situations.
As such, the methodology should be quite easily adaptable to new software systems and/or new source code
languages. Only the extraction and weaving components should be adapted to manage the chosen develop-
ment language, the code structure and the selected coding conventions, all other components can be reused
with minor adaptation (see the components inside the grey dotted line in figure 7.2).
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Figure 7.2: Reusable components.
7.4 Perspectives
Based on the knowledge accumulated both on the case study and on the later generalization of the approach,
some perspectives for enhancement appeared. They can be grouped in two interdependent contexts : en-
hancements related to the user-model interface and enhancements on internal features.
The interface between the developer and the formal models and core could be greatly improved through
the “humanization” of the models. Models used in the proposed approach are closely related to the inputs
expected by the model-checking subroutines. Making them more developer-oriented, or more user-friendly,
would further incitate the developers to use them. For instance, this could be done through the automatic
extraction of the system model (or parts of it) in a very similar way to what is currently done with the
access-control model.
Another area of improvements concerns the requirement language : some operators are very disturbing
for developers not aware of formal methods. In particular, the temporal operators introduce semantics
variations in the property requirements that are not always easy to understand. For instance, think of the
subtle difference between these two expressions :
true : alone(John, alwayswill(allowed(John, read, Z))
true : alwayswill(alone(John, allowed(John, read, Z))
The first one states that John has a strategy such that he will always be able to read object “Z”, where the
second one states that John will always have a strategy to be able to read “Z", i.e. that John will always
be able to read “Z". While path or agent operators behave closely to what the intuition expects, under-
standing the potential consequences of the introduction of the temporal operators requires to understand
their inner semantics. Sadly, this process is out of reach for most of our target public. This causes lots
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of errors and incertitudes when adding temporal properties into the requirements, which might impact the
results of the verification process. A possible solution for this problem could be to provide the users with a
scenario-based property editor : a tool which would provide them some instantiated trace examples for each
property written. This would allow the developer specifying the property to visually verify if the property
he intended to specify is equivalent to the property he just wrote.
On the potential internal enhancements side, the very first one should be to tackle the potential code scram-
bling problem. Cycling through the extraction/verification/weaving processes tend to modify the whole
source code structure even though little to no modifications were made on the model. This has the nasty
side effect of making the code harder to understand to the developer. Furthermore, he may not understand
why a minor modification on the model should completely change the appearance of his code.
The same applies to the proposed correction generalization techniques : the set of currently proposed tech-
niques usually generates only very specific corrective measures. Some of them are extended to very generic
ones, but this process often misses its objective of finding the “proper” generalization. A finer-grained
analysis should be able to decide which generalization to apply and to what extent. This could be further
improved if the method could consider the set of requirements as a whole instead of as a sequence of in-
dependent requirements. Considering all the rules together would allow the generalization of the results
obtained in several rules, thus making the process easier.
The collection and externalizing the access-control related elements into dedicated components could also
be a direct way to improve code quality and security. Limiting the number of places where the security
elements are scattered into the code allows the developer to manage more easily the potential changes and
reduces the possibility of mistakes.
Finally, it should be possible to relax some of the coding conventions imposed on the source code without
adding too much complexity to the extraction, verification and weaving steps. This would allow developers
to use more code constructs, removing the sometimes present feeling that only ridiculously simple source
code fragments are allowed.
As a final thought on these future perspectives, automatic model extraction from the source code is defi-
nitely a way to allow many developers to benefit from the advantages given by the formal methods without
requiring them to write all the models themselves. It reduces the entry-cost to verification and limits the
number of errors that can be made during the redaction of the models. As such, it allows developers to
produce better and more secure code, and code that can provably satisfy the requirements. It can help to
show the benefits of a formal method approach without having to bear the full price of conventional formal
methodologies. It also helps the developers think twice about the features they have to implement : once
for the specification and once for the implementation.
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7.4.1 Certification
Even if this was not the primary objective of this work, the question of wether or not our proposed approach
can meet the quality standards of a widely accepted industry standard has to be tackled. Convincing the de-
velopers of the quality of the produced results is the main objective, but being also able to convince external
users is a nice extension. This would allow the considered software to publicly claim its verified quality
level.
Attempting to confront this approach with the various evaluation assurance levels requirements defined in
the Common Criteria (see section 1.4.1, page 21) is not an easy task. The lower EAL levels are trivially
satisfied by the production of a proper and verified specification (in our case an access-control model) rep-
resenting the code and its verification against the requirements. However, the higher requirements (from
EAL5 up to EAL7) require both 1) a formal verification of the conformity of the implementation towards
the specification and 2) the proper confidence in the certification authority issuing the verification.
In the context of our methodology, the first criteria is met through the automatic extraction of the model
from the code, so could our proposed methodology compete for the highest EAL level. However, the sec-
ond criteria will almost be impossible to satisfy : as the verification (and more importantly, the correction
of the detected problems) is a user-assisted process, the confidence in the produced results will always be
limited by the confidence in the craft of the considered user and will hardly be recognized outside of the
development team.
It is also hardly possible to hire a well-recognized external reviewer to apply the methodology to the code.
Our methodology requires the usage of the coding conventions found into the code as well as a certain user
craft into the management of the verification routines (for instance through the proper setting of the upper
bounds on objects sets). Both of these are not easily reachable for an external reviewer.
7.4.2 Longer-term perspectives
If we push the reflexion one step further, the place of the developer inside the application development
scheme has to be re-thinked. How can we expect a fully secure, flaw-less, application to be created by
mistake-prone elements like human beings ? Errors, approximations and misunderstandings are inherent
parts of human beings, as is creativity, and cannot be avoided in human enterprises.
Limiting ever more the acting space of developers to prevent the occurrence of problems may not be the
proper way to make software engineering evolve on the long-term. In the last century, the physical goods
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engineering processes have been extensively adapted to allow the execution of tasks by entities designed
to avoid errors : robots. This has improved the quality and speed of production of many products, but it
removed any proactivity from the process. Robots only do what they were programmed to do; no more, no
less. As such they cannot anticipate the future problems and needs or provide innovative solutions.
When applied wisely, automatization eases the development process. For instance, only few people still
produce languages parsers by hand nowadays, because automatic tools exist to produce them almost auto-
matically. But we must keep in mind that a software system is not only an assembly of pieces of code; it
is much more than the simple concatenation its components. It is an vision of the mind. It is designed and
implemented to perform a task and react (more or less) appropriately to any unexpected situation that could
occur.
In our opinion, the creativity of developer can be supervised, for instance by guidelines, standards or helper
tools, but should never be muted. Firstly because turning developers into mere executants will cause a great
deal of resistance among them, opposing any changes. Secondly because the human factor is and should
remain an integral part of the software development process. The intervention of the developer is required
to translate the wishes of the client into a proper specification; preventing the developer from producing
code will simply move the problem from code-verification to specification-verification. Finally, software
systems ultimately are tools, used by human beings, for human beings. Even though it sometimes might be
desirable, they cannot be much more perfects than their creators.
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This chapters presents an overview of the internals of the prototype designed to support the methodology
presented in the previous chapters. A general definition of the implementation objectives will be given.
Then some insights on the code and model parsing and weaving techniques used will be shown (items 1©
and 2© in figure 8.1), followed by details on the verification and reporting routines (items marked 3© and 4©).
Remarks :
The development of this prototype supporting the presented methodology was done in the context of the
motivating example presented in section 3.1 (page 45). As such, it focussed on the operations expected by
the audience developers and on step-by-step interaction. The complete automation of the process was not
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Figure 8.1: Scope of the implementation.
the primary objective of this work.
A direct consequence of this is that many routines and screens do produce lots of “debug-like” outputs
aimed at allowing a quick and deep understanding of the processes being run. These outputs could be re-
moved from future versions but were a big help to convince partner developers of the interest of the tool
and give intuitive insights of what was done. More importantly, these outputs allowed them to understand
how and why the given results where produced.
8.1 Usage Scenario
The main use-case governing the development of this prototype can be found in figure 8.21. It contains
three different users profiles :
• the “lone” developer, or integrator, labelled Dev-A. He’s the one in charge of the verification of the
whole considered project and is only interested in the end results of the verification, not on detailled
considerations.
• the specification editor, labelled Spec. This user is in charge of the redaction of the requirements;
his role is to express the properties expected from the software system in the given requirements
language.
• the debugger developer, labelled Dev-B, is a refinement of the Dev-A one. This user profile differs
from its predecessor in the interest he has for the deep understanding of the internal flows leading to
1In order to keep the figure as readable as possible, only the most important relations between the tasks have been drawn.
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the produced results. As such, he may attempt to directly access intermediary datas and execute the
inner routines of the model.
These three roles can be assumed by the same user. In small development teams, developers, specification
writers and integrators are often the same physical being, changing roles with the evolution of the needs
and with the time available for the validation stage.
System
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Figure 8.2: Main use-cases
The various tasks that these users can perform are almost directly derived from their naming convention :
• Extract AC : extracts the access-control related elements from the considered source code. Often
takes extensive usage of the coding conventions to ease the process.
• Verify AC : confronts the obtained access-control model with the expressed requirements. Produces
execution traces in case of detected violation.
• Weave AC : translates the (possibly modified) access-control model back into the desired format.
– Weave to Model : produces a access-control component representing the access-control model
into the chosen model. If needed, also produce the code stubs interfaces to this component.
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– Weave to Code : produces executable code (here Java code) implementing the rules appearing
into the access-control model.
• Insert Reqs : express the requirements expected from the considered software system into the re-
quirements formalism.
• Verify Code : combines the other tasks into a single workflow and proposes an easy to use frontend
to the various contained routines, hiding away as much inner details as possible.
Modulo some implementation optimisations, all the “atomic” tasks map almost directly to the structures of
the previous chapters. They respectively implement the procedures and produce the deliverables defined in
the specified section :
Task see
Extract AC section 4.2, p. 59
Verify AC section 5.2, p. 91
Weave AC section 6.1, p. 104
Insert Reqs section 4.3, p. 76
In the following sections, we will focus on the interactions and expectations of these 3 specific profiles in
the process of performing the desired tasks.
8.2 Architecture
To optimize the adaptability of the implementation to new source code structures and/or to new formalisms,
the general architecture of the prototype was designed to insulate verification and result production routines
from the inputs management.
The general architecture of this prototype is detailed in figure 8.3. The core element is interfaced with the
source code, requirements and access-control model via adapters components. The role of these adapters
is to convert the external formalism (for instance the Java source code language) into an internal general
tree-like format. It allows to encompass in these components all the complexity of the parsing and code
interpretation routines. For instance, considering the case of the source adapter in the context of our running
example, the source code parsing (including the usage of the coding conventions) is completely encapsu-
lated into a single component. Furthermore, an evolution of the external format only requires us to adapt
the interface component, keeping the core routines untouched.
All these components can communicate through the core component. Shared-interest elements can be
stored in a shared storage area managed by the core routines and can be retrieved every time necessary.
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Figure 8.3: General architecture
The adapter components are responsible for the management of all the interaction of the core routines and
the considered languages, both for the inputs and the outputs. This allows to keep coherent coding con-
ventions between the extraction and the weaving of the elements, while, at the same time, allowing to read
from one model and output to another one if required.
The remaining of this section focusses on these components and details their inner structures and design
choices.
8.2.1 Adapters
The adapter components are responsible for the management of the interface between an external formalism
(e.g. Java source code, requirements language from chapter 4, ...) and the corresponding internal represen-
tation. They act both as input and as output filter.
For readability purposes, the input and output processes will be separated in the remaining of this section.
However, their implementations are often merged into one single component to be able to benefit from the
choices and findings made on previous runs. Think for instance of the source code adapter : when produc-
ing code in the same formalism as it was read from, the code weaving process can greatly benefit from the
structures and conventions used in the reading stage.
This leads to the adapter class structure found in figure 8.4 : the obtained adapter, here labelled JavaAdapterC1,
inherits from the selected parser and weaver components to become a bi-directional interface. In this illus-
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Figure 8.4: Adapters hierarchy.
Operations marked with an “(S)” are stubs operations, they do not perform
any action. parse() is the input operation and weave() the output one.
tration, the resulting adapter component is dedicated to the parsing and the weaving of java source code
with the help of the specific coding convention set labelled C1.
8.2.1.1 Parsers
Parsers, or input adapters, are components dedicated to he reading of an external formalism and to its trans-
lation into the adapted internal representation. Two kinds of parsers can be distinguished here : “dumb”
parser and “extended” parser.
“Dumb” parser, who only translate their input into the proper structure (for instance the world model parser
or the requirements parser) are produced almost automatically from a grammar representing the expected
language. Parser generation tools are then used to produce the executable source code implementing the
adapter component. In our case, the ATNLR parser generation tool [Par11] was used.
On the other hand, “extended” parser, are parsers which need to translate and interpret/analyze their input
before producing all their results. An example of this second category is the source code parser: in addition
to the standard abstract syntax tree representing its input, it is also required to check that some elements of
the input (in our example the access-control related methods) can be properly extracted and converted in
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the access-control model. These parsers heavily depend on the coding conventions to produce useful results.
The exact set of coding conventions that can be used by the parser greatly vary depending on the considered
source code project. In the context of this study, the parser is expected to be able to 1) precisely identify
which sections of the code are related to access-control and 2) extract the sequence of operations repre-
senting each of the execution paths found in these sections. The upper and lower bounds on the coding
conventions set are trivial : with no coding conventions at all the interpretation of the source code is hardly
computable and with super-restrictive conventions forbidding every code constructs, the parsing process is
trivial.
As a consequence, the allowed conventions set usually is a trade-off between the freedom to write any code
constructs into the code and the need to be able to precisely identify what is access-control related and what
is not. In addition to that, real software engineering processes also have to take into account the conventions
used by the software developers themselves : as members of the same developer team, they usually share
(at least partially) the same philosophy about “good” and “bad” code constructs.
8.2.1.2 Weavers
Weavers, or output adapters, are the exact opposite of parsers : they translate the internal representation
of an element into the chosen external formalism. They, however, work pretty in the same way, with the
addition that their source formalism is completely non-ambiguous. The weaving process usually consist in
the translation of the source formalism to the target formalism and in the insertion of the produced elements
at the right place in target code.
When weaving to a model different from the initial source code (see section 6.3, p. 109 for details), the
weaver can also generate the method stubs to redirect the source code calls to this external model. In this
way, the code functionality is maintained.
8.2.1.3 Joint effort
Both kinds of adapters have the ability to store some parsing state informations designed to help any future
parsing or weaving to the considered formalism. This local storage can be done locally to the adapter (for
instance, to help weaving back the extracted code) or globally in the code storage area (for informations
that could be useful for other components).
The most obvious example of such information transfert between an input and an output adapter lies in
the Java source code adapter developer in the context of the case study presented in chapter 3. In order
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to limit as much as possible the code structure changes between the successive iterations of the approach,
the access-control rules appearing into the model are linked with the code structures from which they were
created (i.e. when they are parsed). In this way, the weaver can reproduce the exact same code blocs each
time it encounters an access-control rules untouched by the verification and correction routines, limiting the
appearance of the code obfuscation side-effect.
8.2.2 Core Routines
The core component englobes two main elements : shared utilitarian routines and components (including
the GUI and user interactions management routines) and the verification / result reporting subsystem. In
the following, we will only adress the verification/result reporting aspect.
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Figure 8.5: Core Internals.
The general workflow of the verification stage is presented in figure 8.5. It basically consists in a human-
assisted process taking the various models of the considered system as inputs and, if applicable, producing
possibly modified versions of the access-control and requirements models as outputs.
It should be noted that both of these processes are human-assisted ones. The interaction of the developer
is required to fix the upper bounds on the model-checking state space generation and, more importantly, to
guide the reporting process and select the most adapted correction propositions.
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8.2.2.1 Verification
The verification stage, labelled MC (model-checking) in the figure 8.5, verifies whether or not the access-
control model and world/system models given as input satisfy the expressed requirements.
Requirements are verified one at a time, in a iterative approach. The model-checking algorithm used is
based on a bounded model-checking approach : upper bounds are placed on objects and subjects sets car-
dinality, then the reachable state-space is built and checked using an adapted version of the verification
algorithm found in [AHK97].
This approach is far from being optimal and produces huge state spaces, but it allows to almost intuitively
explicit the behavior of the verification back to the developers. Thereby counterbalancing its weaknesses.
8.2.2.2 Reporting
As described in section 5.3 (p. 93), the result reporting process only produce correction proposals. When a
requirement violation is detected in the model-checking stage, the error trace leading to the violating state
and the potential property/requirement corrections are presented to the developer. His role is then to choose
the most appropriate one from the list or to implement his own one.
Selecting the most suitable solution quickly becomes a problem when the number of alternatives rises : the
set of potential solutions becomes hardly manageable by the developer. Furthermore, as the differences
between the proposed corrections tightens, the helping developer becomes rapidly confused between the
alternatives. Attempts to limit this problem, for instance by sorting the list based on a similarity factor with
the previously selected solutions, have been made, but none was satisfactory.
Up to now, no satisfying human-computer interface have been found to support this process : the proper vi-
sualisation of the violating trace and the modeling of the exact consequences of a proposed rule/requirement
update still are open questions, specially when the target audience is not familiar with formal methods.
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9
Conclusion
In this document, we addressed the problematic of the co-evolution of the requirements specification and
the source code implementing them. Focussing on the access-control aspect of a software system, our ob-
jective was to provide the developers with an almost automatic way to propagate any modification made on
the source code (or the access-control specification) to the access-control model (resp. the source code).
We aimed at making the iterative code development scheme more secure by automatizing the detection and
resolution of the violations of the requirements introduced through code features evolution.
In particular, we approached this topic in the context of small development teams, with little to no under-
standing of standard formal verification techniques. We attempted to provide them with a methodology that
does not disturb their current development practices but provides them useful information on the potential
inconsistencies between their requirements specification and their implemented features.
We designed a language to model the access-control rules implemented into the executable code. This lan-
guage is able to model almost any access-control primitives, including DAC, MAC, RBAC and XACML
and was built with the idea of being usable directly by the developer if needed. As such it only uses simple
syntax constructs and its semantics was kept as intuitive as possible.
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An automatic access-control model extraction procedure was implemented to extract, from the executable
source code, the elements required to model the access-control behavior of the considered application. This
procedure takes advantage of the coding conventions used by the developer inside his source code as well
as some simplification hypothesis. It produces an access-control model that is at the same time human-
readable and understandable and complete enough to faithfully model the implemented decision rules.
Then a language adapted to specify any access-control related requirements was designed. It takes into
account both simple permissions and complex decision rules involving coalition of users (both allies and
adversaries) and temporal operators. Again, this language was built to be editable by the developer; it was
kept as simple as possible without losing too much expressivity.
A procedure to transform the access-control model into executable code able to fit inside the considered
application was given. This procedure tries to be as un-damaging as possible, it attempts not to modify any
items in the source code that are not affected by the model updates. However, this is not always possible
and, sometimes, the produced code, although being functionally equivalent to the original code, is gener-
ated using a different structure. Some potential optimizations of the proposed procedure aiming at limiting
this problem, like the pragma, have also been discussed.
Then, using standard model-checking algorithms, we verified the extracted access-control model against the
expressed requirements. If inconsistencies are found, we propose an execution trace leading to the property
violation along with corrective measures if applicable. These measures can apply either on the access-
control model, or on the requirement specification. They can be either ad-hoc corrections, forbidding only
the violating scenario, or generalized corrections, attempting to “guess” what missing property is causing
the inconsistency. Modification on the access-control model can be proposed either on the access-control
model language or directly into the executable code. This process is human-assisted : corrective measures
are proposed to the developer, his role is to choose which one to apply. This allows to keep the developer in
total control over his code : he is the one to decide which correction to implement and how to implement it.
After that, the main strengths and weaknesses of the approach have been discussed and general possibili-
ties for improvements have been proposed. In particular, some lessons learned from the application of the
methodology to a real software system, with the intervention of the original developers showed the limi-
tations of the approach, mostly the change of mind required to move from a “code then test” to a “code
then verify” philosophy. Some habits are very hard to go against and it may take time before the benefits of
formal methods overcome the inherent costs induced on the software project.
Some questions about the verification result reporting have been left open. In particular, the representation
of the semantics of the temporal logic operator still cause trouble in the mind of developers not used to
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formal methods. Building textual or graphic representations of time-dependent elements is a challenge with
a broader impact than the field of computer science.
Another open research topic lies in the tight dependency between the quality of the access-control extrac-
tion from the source code and the coding conventions required on the source code. Lots of improvements
in the code parsing and understanding are possible. Going along with this topic is the problem of the code
structure delimiting and the code scrambling prevention. Better code semantics extraction algorithm could
allow to prevent the unwanted side-effects of the weaving process obfuscating correct code.
Finally, this approach still heavily depends on the quality of the developer’s code. We attempt to verify that
the specified requirements do match with the access-control model implemented into the code, but we do
not check if the access-control sections of the source code are properly called throughout the application.
Enlarging the scope of the extraction and analysis could permit to verify these calls, but this remains an
open question in this document.
As a conclusion to this work, building secure code is and will remain a difficult and open question. Cur-
rently, the only way to guarantee a 100% secure code is to generate it from scratch using adapted methods
(think for instance of the B method) or to use sometimes very complex formal proofs. These approaches go
against the general trend in current software development which is based on rapid prototyping and more or
less extensive software testing. The presented method, as every method based on formal methods, provides
models and tools to assist the developers in their harsh task of building good software. But by themselves,
tools are useless; only when used by the proper artisan can they show their benefits and produce master-
pieces.
As secure code is the founding stone of secure software, any step toward more secure software is a step in
the right direction; as no method can satisfy all needs, this methodology only is an attempt to bring inter-
ested developers closer to secure software.
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